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Abstract
This paper discusses three relevant logics (S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, crossS
∗
fde) that
obey Component Homogeneity—a principle that Goddard and Routley
introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper estab-
lishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization
result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity—
that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their
consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results
for S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, crossS
∗
fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent
calculi for S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, crossS
∗
fde. Among the other accomplishments of
the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallde´n, Deutsch
and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define (a given family
of) containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion
fragment of S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, crossS
∗
fde and the connections between crossS
∗
fde
and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S∗fde as a
relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical
tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further
systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss
Routley’s criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and
overview some open issues.
Keywords: Relevant logic, component homogeneity, variable-inclusion con-
ditions, meaninglessness, containment logic, characterization theorems, se-
quent calculi.
1 Introduction
Throughout his career, Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan)
challenged many received views in logic and formal philosophy. His fore-
most challenge opposes the belief that conditional statements from our ev-
eryday or mathematical reasoning can be captured by the conditionals from
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classical logic or intuitionistic logic. The rationale of the challenge is that
classical and intuitionistic conditionals verify the so-called paradoxes of ma-
terial implication—an example of which is the (classically, intuitionistically)
valid formula ¬ϕ → (ϕ → ψ); in general, these paradoxes involve (classi-
cally, intuitionistically) valid conditionals where the antecedent seem not
to be (sufficiently) relevant to the consequent—the clearest case of this is
when the two do not share any content (that is, any propositional variable).
This challenge involved Routley with a number of logicians—Anderson and
Belnap [2], Dunn [20, 21], Meyer [51] and later Priest [48], Restall [22], and
Mares [39], among others—and gave rise to relevant logic. This family of
systems imposes a criterion of informational relevance on valid conditionals
or inferences—namely: antecedent (or premises) and consequent (or conclu-
sions) must share some propositional variables.
Another challenge by Routley is to the idea that meaningless expres-
sions do not need a specific logical treatment. Again, Routley shared this
challenge with other logicians—mainly, Brady [10, 9] and Goddard [33], but
also Bochvar [6] and Hallde´n [35]. This challenge gave rise to the logic of
significance. By ‘meaningless expressions’, Routley, Goddard and Brady (as
well as Bochvar and Hallde´n) mean well-formed sentences that fail to ex-
press a proposition. These include ‘Caesar is a prime number’, ‘Colourless
green ideas sleep furiously’, or—if we do not wish to stick to these revered
examples—‘Jack Bruce walks like a bearded rainbow’. Contrary to the re-
ceived view they were facing, Routley, Goddard, and Brady believed that a
logic of meaninglessness could bring rigor and clarity in our understanding
of the notion. In doing this, Routley and colleagues developed a seman-
tic account of meaninglessness, where meaninglessness is represented by a
truth-value beside truth and falsity.1 Also, they accept that the ‘meaningless
value’ should obey the principle of Component Homogeneity (CH), accord-
ing to which a complex sentence is meaningless if (and only if) at least one
its component is meaningless.
In this paper, we bring together these two research interests by Routley,
and we explore three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity.
In particular, we investigate a relevant logic of meaninglessness (Section 3)
and two cognate formalisms that obey Component Homogeneity but fail to
qualify as logics of meaninglessness according to Goddard and Routley’s cri-
teria. We establish characterization results and complete sequent calculi for
these logics, and characterization results for two wider families of formalisms.
1Routley, Brady and Goddard thoroughly defend this view against objections in a trail
of papers including notably [9].
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Finally, we discuss connections with containment logic and some open issues.
The paper proceeds as follows. The rest of the introduction provides
background on relevant logic and Component Homogeneity, and it discusses
the relevance of the results we present in this paper. Section 2 introduces
the basic notions and formal settings of the paper; in particular, it presents
Belnap’s four-valued logic Efde and proposes the Weak Kleene logic K
w
3 as
a viable logic of meaningless according to criteria followed by Routley and
Goddard [33]. Section 3 presents the five-valued logic S∗fde as a relevant logic
of meaninglessness. Section 4 detours from the focus on meaninglessness by
[10, 32, 33] and explores two logics that obey CH while designating one con-
taminating value. These include a system dual to S∗fde—which we call dS
∗
fde—
and a subsystem of S∗fde and dS
∗
fde—which we call crossS
∗
fde. Section 5 also
investigates the single-conclusion/single-premise version of the three systems
above. Interestingly, the single-conclusion/single-premise of crossS∗fde turns
to be closely related to the Logic of Equality from [25]. Section 6 discusses
Routley’s criticism of the containment logic project stemming out of [42] in
light of the results from the paper, and two open issues. The section also
discuss the connections between our approach and the results obtained by
a construction known as P lonka sum of logical matrices [8, 7]. Section 7
introduces sequent calculi for S∗fde, dS
∗
fde and crossS
∗
fde. Finally, Section 8
sums up the results of the paper and provides some conclusions.
Relevant Logic. Systems of relevant logic satisfy one of two variable-
sharing principles that ensure some element of relevance between premises
(or antecedent) and conclusions (consequent). A number of such systems
obey the following Variable-Sharing Principle (VSP):
Γ |=L ψ ⇒ var(Γ) ∩ var(ψ) 6= ∅ (VSP)
where Γ |=L ψ reads2 ‘ψ is an L-consequence of Γ’ and var(Γ) is the set of
propositional variables occurring in the set Γ of formulas—we write var(ψ)
for var({ψ}). VSP corresponds to an intuitive view on relevance, namely:
there is no logical connection between a set Γ of formulas and ψ if they
share no information (that is, no propositional variable). Some relevant
systems are designed to replace VSP with a principle ensuring relevance for
2VSP could equally be formulated by replacing |= with `—a relation of derivability.
Since in the most part of this paper we deploy semantic methods (exception: Section 7),
we go with the definition of VSP in terms of |=.
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an intensional conditional:
∅ |=L
∧
ϕi∈Γ
ϕi → ψ ⇒ var(Γ) ∩ var(ψ) 6= ∅ (VSP→)
The principle states that if a conditional is logically true (in L), then its
antecedent is relevant for the consequent. The usual strategy to get VSP→
is to define an intensional conditional that complements (truth-functional)
negation, disjunction, conjunction. Another strategy is to define a condi-
tional that internalizes the consequence relation; this conditional—known
as first-degree entailment—typically gives a restricted conditional allowing
for no nesting. We briefly discuss this option in Section 5,3 but we leave the
investigation of intensional conditionals and VSP→ to a further paper: the
combination between relevance and Component Homogeneity has not been
explored before and it already displays interesting features for a conditional-
free language.4 Thus, we believe we are justified in restricting ourselves to
the purely extensional language of propositional logic. In this paper, we
will focus on the VSP and, in general, on syntactical requirements that af-
fect the consequence relation. Also, the connections between logics with a
first-degree entailment conditional and the single-premise/single-conclusion
restriction of consequence relation from suitable conditional-free logics has
induced logicians to apply the term ‘first-degree entailment’—from now on,
fde—also to the latter. We follow this convention here.
Routley gave decisive contributions to the semantics of relevant logic, in
particular by providing the so-called Routley-Meyer semantics [52] together
with Bob Meyer.5 Crucial to this setting is the interpretation of relevant
conditionals in terms of a ternary relation between worlds and negation in
terms of an involutive operation on worlds—the so-called Routley star. Some
systems of relevant logic may dispense with the intensional apparatus set by
the Routley–Meyer semantics, since they can be interpreted by using many-
valued semantics—usually including four or more values. Since the logics
3The discussion there concerns a first-degree entailment connective that obey the
variable-inclusion requirement VIC→, but the same considerations from the section applies
to first-degree entailment connectives in general.
4By ‘conditional-free language’ here we mean a language whose only conditional (i) is
the material conditional (defined in terms of negation and disjunction), and (ii) is not
detachable—that is, it fails Modus Ponens.
5This semantics deploys a variation of Kripke models where worlds (here, ‘set-ups’)
may lack information about some variable p and hold inconsistent information about some
other variable q. For the problems of this semantics—mainly connected to its informal
interpretation—see [45], [39, pp. 38–56] and [50].
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we are approaching fall in this category, in this paper we deploy a seman-
tical setting that is truth-functional and many-valued—see Section 2 below.6
The Principle of Component Homogeneity. The project of the logic
of significance by [10, 32, 33] centers around three tenets: (a) meaningless-
ness is treated as a truth value alongside truth and falsity ; (b) ‘one does not
want to be committed to sometimes asserting logical nonsense’ [9]; (c) mean-
ingful (i.e. true or false) sentences obey classical logic. Thus, the logic of
significance captures the impact of meaningless expressions on classical rea-
soning. Accordingly, [33] introduce an array of systems, each being related
to a viable principle one could want for meaningless expressions. One prin-
ciple Routley and Goddard discuss at length is what they call Component
Homogeneity :
(CH) Any compound sentence with a nonsignificant component is nonsignif-
icant, any compound sentence where all components are significant is
itself significant.
Routley and Goddard accept the principle as far as the standard proposi-
tional language7 is considered [33, p. 331]. Thus, it is reasonable to take CH
(under the intended restriction) as representative of Goddard and Routley’s
view on meaninglessness.8 Since Goddard and Routley endorse (a), CH stip-
ulates that a formula ϕ gets a (or the) meaningless value m if at least one
subformula ψ has the value. In systems obeying CH, a disjunction like ‘Bob
Dylan is a singer or Jack Bruce walks like a bearded rainbow’ is assigned
the ‘meaningless’ value, in conformity with CH.
There are many ways to implement (a)–(c) and CH formally. Goddard
and Routley [32, 33] propose the logic S0, which, due to a non-standard
definition of logical consequence—see Section 2—turns out to coincide with
6Other notable semantics are the algebraic semantics from [2, 23] (mainly due to Dunn)
and the semilattice semantics from [55]. Detailing these semantics would take us far from
the aim of the paper, but notice that all these semantics somehow accommodate—albeit in
very different ways—the intuition that the information we receive may fail to be maximal
and consistent.
7By ‘standard propositional language’, here we mean a language whose logical operators
are negation, disjunction, conjunction, and the standardly defined material conditional.
This restriction is natural, since Goddard and Routley want to be free to enrich the lan-
guage and express the fact that a sentence is meaningful (or meaningless), and they want
‘It is meaningless that colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ to be true, not meaningless.
8Routley and Goddard deviate from CH from time to time for specific purposes in [33],
but [33, p. 331] provides evidence that they support the tenability of the principle from a
general point of view.
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classical logic CL. This choice has some serious drawbacks, that we detail
in Section 2. Here, we will opt for the logic Kw3 from [6] as a natural way to
follow CH and items (a)–(c), while avoiding the limits of S0.
The logic of significance from [10, 32, 33] is not the only tradition (and
many-valued approach) to investigate the impact of meaninglessness on our
reasoning. An independent project is that of Bochvar [6], which indeed in-
terprets Kw3 as a logic of meaninglessness. In particular, K
w
3 is the internal
fragment of Bochvar’s logic B3.
9 We will come back to this in Section 2. An-
other related project is that of the logic of nonsense by Hallde´n, developed
in [35]. This project differs from those by Bochvar and Brady, Goddard,
and Routley in that it assumes the meaningless value to be designated. We
briefly discuss Hallde´n’s project in Section 4.
For the sake of completeness, notice that the projects related to [33] often
include formal devices that express the notion that a sentence is meaning-
ful. In particular, the systems T0 from [10, 32] and H3 from [35] extend
standard propositional language with a connective ◦, with ◦ϕ reading ‘ϕ is
meaningful’.10 Albeit interesting, the connective does not proves relevant
here, as dealing with it would lead us far from the main focus of the paper.
We postpone the investigation of these extended logics of meaninglessness
to future research.
Component Homogeneity and Contamination. Before closing, notice
that CH concerns meaninglessness, which is the informal interpretation of
a given truth value—at least, if we endorse (a) above. The Contamination
Principle CP (Section 2) is a formal counterpart of CH. Thus, while CH
mentions the informal interpretation of a truth value, CP details its for-
mal behavior independently from any informal interpretation.11 However,
we believe that this distinction should not be exaggerated, and that we can
reasonably relax it a bit. Indeed, the notion of a ‘component homogeneity’
refers to the way a property ‘transmits’ from the component of a sentence
to the sentence itself. In principle, meaninglessness might well not be the
only notion that behaves in the way detailed by CH. From this point of
view, CH just details the way a property transmits relative to given entities
9The logic B3 extends L with a connective } such that }ϕ expresses that ‘ϕ is mean-
ingful and true’—more precisely, } works as a function from {t, e, f} to {t, f}.
10A distinctive mark of these systems is that a statement of meaningfulness ◦ϕ (or
meaninglessness, ¬◦ϕ) can be true or false, but not meaningless.
11For instance, the designated value a from the logic PWK (Section 4) obeys CP, but
it is dubious that it can be read as ‘meaninglessness’—to be sure, it cannot be read this
way by Goddard and Routley, since it violates condition (b).
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(that is, sentences), and it can be reasonably taken to coincide with CP.12
As a consequence, here we feel free to apply the labels CH and ‘component
homogeneity’ also to logics that Goddard and Routley would not accept as
logics of meaninglessness, as soon as some value in their semantics obeys CP.
Some of these logics have a designated contaminated value (see Section 4).
In dealing with them, we will recall the position by Goddard and Routley on
designation and meaninglessness, in order not to create confusion (see espe-
cially Section 4). An interpretation of a designated contaminating value as
meaningless has been proposed by Hallde´n [35]. Although we do not wish
to commit with Hallde´n’s reading, we believe that his motivating remarks
deserve more attention. We will be neutral on the tenability of the interpre-
tation, however.
Component Homogeneity and Containment Logics. Interestingly,
Component Homogeneity results in syntactical conditions on the conse-
quence relation. Indeed, we know by [28] and [56] that any many-valued
logic L obeying component homogeneity for at least one non-designated value
satisfies the following Weak Variable-Inclusion Condition:
Γ |=L ψ ⇒ (i) Γ |=L ∅ or (ii) var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ) (WVIC)
The condition imposes the requirement that the variables of the conclusion
of a valid inference must be contained in the variables of the premises, except
when the premise-set has no model in the logic (whence the label ‘weak’).
Clearly, if L is paraconsistent—that is, ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=L ψ—then L will obey the
stronger Variable Inclusion Condition:13
Γ |=L ψ ⇒ var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ) (VIC)
The condition also characterizes systems of containment logic14 that stem
out of [42] by Parry and are investigated by[28, 27]. These include, among
the others, the system S∗fde that we discuss in Section 3. The original project
by Parry centers on the variable-inclusion requirement
∅ |=L
∧
ϕ∈Γ
ϕ→ ψ ⇒ var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ) (VIC→)
12Under this reading, CH as presented by [33], would be a particular informal reading
of CP—or better, of its application to a non-designated value. By contrast, taken in its
generality, it would basically be the same as CP.
13This follows from the fact that every set of formulas is satisfiable in a paraconsistent
logic.
14The name comes from the fact that, in these logics, for an entailment to be valid,
the information from the consequent (or conclusion) must be contained in the information
from the antecedent (or premises).
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that [42] envisions for analytic implication,15 but VIC seems to provide a
natural counterpart for the systems that fail to have tautologies, like the
majority of logics investigated here or in [28, 27].16 In particular, in these
logics VIC seems to lift the original requirement by Parry to the only suitable
candidate for entailment between formulas.17 For this reason, we believe it
legitimate to call a ‘containment logic’ any system obeying VIC, even though
Parry originally proposed VIC→.18
Of course, any logic L obeying VIC also obeys VSP.19 Thus, any logic L
obeying VIC is a relevant logic. By contrast, satisfaction of WVIC does not
imply satisfaction of VSP, since it leaves the possibility open that p∧¬p |=L
q: some logics obeying WVIC are non-relevant with respect to their conse-
quence relations—this is the case with S0, see Section 2.
Significance of the Results. We conclude with some remarks on the
topicality of our logics and results. The introduction of S∗fde proves significant
in bridging two areas of research by Routley, namely relevant logic and the
formal treatment of meaninglessness. The aim of a logic of meaninglessness
is to capture the effect of meaningless expressions on our everyday reasoning.
If we agree with Routley that relevant logic is a suitable way to capture our
everyday reasoning, then formalisms devised in the logic of significance [33],
logic of meaninglessness [6] and logic of nonsense [35] are not satisfactory.
Indeed, they are not relevant logics themselves (see Section 2 and Section 4).
This implies, first, that they do not obey the relevantist criteria above, and,
second, that they do not capture the impact of meaningless expressions on
a relevantist reasoning tool.20 As a concrete example: logics like Kw3 [6]
and S0 [32] let us (validly) infer ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ (c)
15Notice that, in [42], VIC→ is called the Proscriptive Principle.
16[27] calls these systems ‘`-Parry deductive systems’—the focus of that paper is on
derivability—whereas the systems obeying Parry’s original requirement are called ‘→-
Parry deductive systems’.
17Indeed, in Parry’s systems the variable-inclusion requirement is a necessary condition
for an entailment ’s validity. Where entailment can be suitably captured by a conditional
→, like in the system by [42], the original requirement by Parry seems fitter; however,
where no conditional can capture entailment, consequence or derivability relations natu-
rally do the job, and VIC provides a natural option.
18In Section 6, we briefly discuss the issue of integrating a logic obeying VIC with a
conditional obeying VIC→.
19As an anonymous referee pointed out, this remark should be qualified to apply to
logics without propositional constants.
20The two points must be kept distinct: a logic can fit the relevantist criteria and yet fail
to capture the effect of meaninglessness on a relevant reasoning tool. See our discussion
on Sfde in Section 3.
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from ‘Routley’s box is empty and not empty’ (r ∧ ¬r), since contradictions
have no model in Kw3 or S0. However, the inference in question violates the
relevantist criteria for logical (necessary, informational) connection between
sentences, since r and c share no information (propositional variable) at all.
By contrast, the logic S∗fde from Section 3 satisfies the relevantist criteria
and the criteria for a logic of meaninglessness—in particular, it follows CH,
and items (a)–(c) above.
The paper also guarantees a very general insight in the connections be-
tween relevant logic and logic of meaninglessness. In particular, Theorem 1
(Section 3) provides a general semantic recipe to generate logics of mean-
inglessness out of any initial consequence relation. Beside, if the initial
consequence relation is paraconsistent, the theorem provides a recipe to gen-
erate relevant logics of meaninglessness. Theorem 1 also establishes precise
connections between containment logic and relevant logic of meaningless-
ness. Indeed, all the relevant logics of meaninglessness that one can generate
along the recipe by the theorem are systems of containment logic. Contrary
to Routley’s criticism (that we will discuss in Section 6), this implies that
(some) containment logics can be given a very natural and insightful seman-
tics and can be applied as relevant logics of meaninglessness.
The logics dS∗fde and crossS
∗
fde, and the relative results, are primarily of
mathematical interest. Indeed, dS∗fde exemplifies how the dual of a con-
tainment logic behaves, and it brings to the fore of logical discussion a
sort of reverse-containment logic, where information increases in (validly)
inferring a conclusion. Theorem 2 provides a semantic recipe to generate
such systems. In turn, this recipe has strong connections with the formal
treatment of meaninglessness by Hallde´n, which includes a designated non-
classical value that satisfies CH—thus, generalizing the results of [54]. Also,
crossS∗fde is one of the first formalisms to include a combination of different
contaminating values. Its characterization results (Corollary 7, Corollary 8
and Corollary 11.3) reveal interesting connections with the Logic of Equality
Eq by [25].
Finally, Theorems 6, 8 and 10 give proof-theoretical foundations to the
semantic apparatus defining S∗fde, dS
∗
fde and crossS
∗
fde, and they generalize
the techniques by [13].
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we mainly follow a semantic perspective. In conformity with
this, we take a logic to be a pair L = 〈L, |=L〉, where L is a language and |=L
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is a consequence relation.21
2.1 Basic setting
Definition 1 (Language) Given a non-empty set P of propositional vari-
ables, the language LP is recursively defined by the following Backus-Naur
form (BNF):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ
where p ∈ P and ¬, ∨, ∧ receive their standard informal readings (negation,
disjunction and conjunction, respectively). ∆, Γ, Σ, . . . denote sets of arbi-
trary formulas from LP . As for auxiliary notation, remember that var(Γ)
denotes the set of propositional variables occurring in any formula in Γ and
var(ϕ) denotes the propositional variables in ϕ. Finally, we write ϕ ⊃ ψ
as short for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ—as usual, we call this defined connective a material
conditional. From now on, we omit reference to P when possible. As usual,
we interpret a logic based on language L on a many-valued matrix, by means
of a valuation function:
Definition 2 (Logical Matrix) A logical matrix M is a tuple
〈TM,DM, f¬, f∨, f∧〉 such that:
• TM is a non-empty set of truth values, including two particular ele-
ments t, f ∈ TM;
• DM ⊆ TM is a non-empty set of designated values, obeying the con-
dition that t ∈ DM and f /∈ DM;
• f¬ : TM → TM, f∨ : TM × TM → TM, and f∧ : TM × TM → TM.
For every matrix M, we assume that its restriction to {t, f} coincides with
the matrixMCL of classical logic CL. That is, ({t, f}, f¬, f∨, f∧) is a Boolean
algebra.
Definition 3 (Valuation) A valuation based on a matrixM is a mapping
ν : L → TM such that for every k-ary connective ◦ from L and all formulas
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ L, ν(◦(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk)) = f◦(ν(ϕ1), . . . , ν(ϕk)).
21In this paper, we deploy notation and definitions that stem out of the work of Arieli,
Avron and Zamanski—see [3] for instance. We also deploy the definition of the language
via BNF that is standard in theoretical computer science, and which is enjoying increasing
popularity in philosophical logic.
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We denote by VM the set of valuations ν, ν ′, ν ′′ . . . that are based on M,
and by VM(Γ) = {v ∈ VM | v(ϕ) ∈ DM for every ϕ ∈ Γ} the set of the
models of Γ (based onM.) We then define the notion of logical consequence
on M (M-consequence for short):
Definition 4 (Logical Consequence) A matrixM induces a substitution-
invariant consequence relation |=M ⊆ ℘(L)× ℘(L) by letting
Γ |=M ∆ ⇔ for all ν ∈ VM, if ν(ϕ) ∈ DM for all ϕ ∈ Γ,
then ν(ψ) ∈ DM for a ψ ∈ ∆
This is the standard definition of the so-called multiple-conclusion conse-
quence relation. We focus on this relation in this paper, since it gives a
natural semantic counterpart of the derivability relation from the sequent
calculi that we deal with in Section 7.
As is standard practice, we read Γ |=M ∅ as ‘Γ has no model based on
M’, and ∅ |=M ∆ as ‘∆ is a tautological-set in M’—a tautology, if ∆ =
{ψ}. The traditional single-conclusion consequence relation (Γ |=M ψ) and
the single-premise/single-conclusion consequence relation (ϕ |=M ψ) are
just two special cases of the multiple-conclusion notion of consequence.22
In particular, the single-conclusion/single-premise consequence of a logic L
based on L is a suitable way to capture the idea of first-degree entailments
in L—we come back to this in Section 5.
2.2 Generalizing VSP, WVIC and VIC
Use of a multiple-conclusion relation requires that we adapt VSP, WVIC
and VIC in suitable ways. The following is a Generalized Variable-Sharing
Principle:23
Γ |=L ∆ ⇒ var(Γ) ∩ var(∆) 6= ∅ (GVSP)
and these are a Generalized Weak Variable-Inclusion Condition and Gener-
alized Variable-Inclusion Condition, respectively:
Γ |=L ∆ ⇒
{
Γ |=L ∅, or
var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some non-empty ∆′ ⊆ ∆
(GWVIC)
22We adopt the usual conventions and write Γ |=M ψ rather than Γ |=M {ψ} and
ϕ |=M ψ rather than {ϕ} |=M {ψ}.
23When our considerations include, in principle, consequence relations of logics that are
not defined on matrices, we keep use of |=L, as we did in the Introduction.
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Γ |=L ∆ ⇒ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some non-empty ∆′ ⊆ ∆ (GVIC)
If we are to maintain monotonicity in the consequent, the clause that variable
inclusion must hold of a subset ∆′ of ∆ is crucial in both GWVIC and GVIC.
Indeed, the simple condition var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ) cannot be satisfied—in order
too see this, suppose Γ |=M ∆ and var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ); then, by the definition
of M-consequence, we have Γ |=M ∆ ∪Ψ for every Ψ ⊆ L, including those
where var(Ψ) 6⊆ var(Γ). By contrast, GVIC imposes the weaker requirement
that some subset of the conclusion-set satisfies inclusion requirement in the
spirit of VIC.24 Again, any paraconsistent L obeying GWVIC will also obey
GVIC.
Clearly, GVSP, GWVIC, and GVIC imply VSP, WVIC, and VIC, re-
spectively. Also, GVIC implies GVSP. Again, a logic L may satisfy GWVIC
and yet fail GVSP.
2.3 Belnap’s four-valued relevant logic Efde
The logic Efde has been first introduced by [1] and generalized to a ‘useful
four-valued logic’ by [5]. Efde was initially proposed as the fde of the relevant
logic E by [2]. Its semantics is provided by the following matrix.
Definition 5 The matrix MEfde is the logical matrix in which:
• TMEfde = {t, b, n, f}
• DMEfde = {t, b}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
f¬ f∨ t b n f f∧ t b n f
t f t t t t t t t b n f
b b b t b t b b b b f f
n n n t t n n n n f n f
f f f t b n f f f f f f
Efde-consequence falsifies Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ)—that is, it holds
that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=MEfde ψ—and thus Efde qualifies as a paraconsistent logic.25
This in turn implies that VMEfde (ϕ) 6= ∅ for every ϕ ∈ L—every formula
in L has a model in Efde. Efde is also a paracomplete logic—that is, it
falsifies the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) ∅ 6|=MEfde ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ—and it is
non-tautological : ∅ 6|=MEfde ϕ for every ϕ ∈ L. Another remarkable feature
24See also [11] and [54] for this.
25Any valuation ν ∈ VMEfde where ν(ψ) = b and ν(ϕ) = f provides a counterexample.
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concerns the failure of Dunn’s axiom of Confusion ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=MEfde ψ ∨ ¬ψ,
which is characteristic of RMfde.
Most interestingly for us, Efde obeys VSP, and thus it qualifies as a
relevant logic—this is logical folklore and immediate to prove, so we do not
go through it. By contrast, Efde does not obey VIC, as ϕ |=MEfde ϕ ∨ ψ
suffices to show. As a consequence, Efde does not satisfy GVIC, either.
It is well known that Efde is a subsystem of the paraconsistent logic
of paradox LP [46] and the paracomplete strong Kleene logic K3 [38]. In
particular, the matrixMLP for LP obtains by restricting the values ofMEfde
to {t, b, f}, restricting the range of the operations appropriately, and setting
DMLP = {t, b}.
2.4 Component Homogeneity and Meaninglessness
A truth value that obeys CH is provided by the so-called weak Kleene algebra
by [38]:
Definition 6 The weak Kleene algebra WK is the algebraic structure in
which:
• T = {t, e, f}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
f¬ f∨ t e f f∧ t e f
t f t t e t t t e f
e e e e e e e e e e
f f f t e f f f e f
This structure also fits with items (a) and (c) from Routley and Goddard’s
treatment of meaninglessness (see Introduction), thus providing an ideal for-
mal structure for detailing a logic of meaninglessness. Due to these features,
Routley and Goddard [33] use this structure in order to interpret one of their
formalism in the logic of significance, namely logic S0.
A Logic for Meaningless Expressions. The logic S0 defines consequence
in terms of those valuations where premises and conclusion fail to have the
third semantical value e, and this in turn results in classical logic CL.26 The
result of this is that S0 turns to be equivalent to classical logic CL. The choice
26In symbols, we would have Γ |=S0 ∆ ⇔ for every valuation ν ∈ VS0, if (i) ν(ϕ) /∈ e
for every ϕ ∈ Γ and ν(ψ) /∈ e for every ψ ∈ ∆, and (ii) ν(ϕ) = t for every ϕ ∈ Γ, then
ν(ψ) = t for some ψ ∈ ∆.
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by Goddard and Routley secures that nonsense is never asserted, but this
comes at a cost. First, S0-consequence deviates from the standard definition
of consequence in a way that sounds ad hoc. Indeed, the choice is motivated
by [32, 33] by the desire to keep (classical) tautologies. This, however,
does not shed much light on what intuition is captured by the definition of
consequence in S0. Second, a logic of meaninglessness should capture the
effect of meaningless expressions on our reasoning; if our reasoning keeps
being classical, it is hard to trace the impact of meaningless expressions.
Third, we are after a relevant logic of meaninglessness, and a contaminating
logic based on S0 won’t be such a logic; and again, if we adapted consequence
from S0 to fit, say, Efde-reasoning, we would just get Efde. Also in this case,
we would not get the effect of meaningless expressions on our basic (relevant)
reasoning.
In view of these drawbacks, we may want to keep the good points of S0—
CH, the formal expression of items (a) and (c), etc.—and drop the choice
concerning its consequence relation. Resorting to a standard consequence
relation here amounts to define a logic that is weaker than CL. Given tenet
(b)—we should never assert nonsense—a paracomplete many-valued logic
seems to be the most natural option. In turn, if we wish to give formal
expression to items (a)–(c) and CH, while retaining standard consequence,
the logic Kw3 by [6] proves ideal:
Definition 7 The matrix MKw3 is the logical matrix in which:
• TMKw
3
= {t, e, f}
• DKw3 = {t}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as in WK
Notice that this matrix is presented and deployed, independently, by [38]
and [6]. In particular, [38] used the table and resulting logic in order to
prove some results on partially recursive functions, while [6] used them in
his project for a logic of meaninglessness. The value e obeys the following
property:
For all k-ary operations fk definable in MKw3 , fk(v1, . . . , vk) = e ⇔ vi = e
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k
which corresponds to the following property of MKw3 -valuations (the so-
called Contamination Principle):27
27The label is used by [12] and [11]. Other papers refer to it as to infectiousness–see for
instance [27], [28], [54].
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(CP) For all ν ∈ VMKw
3
, ν(ϕ) = e ⇔ ν(p) = e for at least a p ∈ var(ϕ)
In turn, CP gives a rigorous formal interpretation to CH. Kw3 is a paracom-
plete and non-tautological logic, exactly as Efde: for every formula ϕ ∈ L,
VMKw
3
(ϕ) 6= VMKw
3
. By contrast, Kw3 is not a paraconsistent logic, since con-
tradictions have no model in it—as a consequence, ECQ and Confusion are
valid inferences in Kw3 . This implies that K
w
3 is a non-relevant logic.
In view of these features and the previous remarks, considering Kw3 will
just amount to lifting the restrictions imposed by Routley and Goddard to
S0.
Distinctive failures of Kw3 are determined by the behavior of e in relation
with the connectives. For instance, Disjunctive Addition (DA) fails:
ϕ 6|=MKw
3
ϕ ∨ ψ DA
By CP, ϕ ∨ ψ will receive value e any time ψ receives it, no matter which
value is assigned to ϕ. Thus, from ‘New York is in the USA’, we cannot infer
that ‘New York is in the USA or colorless green ideas sleep furiously’—in
conformity with CH. Notice, however, that the following multiple-conclusion
version of DA holds in Kw3 :
28
ϕ |=MKw
3
ϕ,ψ DA′
Finally, truth of a formula behaves as a guarantee that all the components
of the formula are meaningful:
ϕ ∨ ψ |=MKw
3
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
The paper [11] provides a characterization of Kw3 , which we reproduce here:
Proposition 1 (Theorem 4.3 by [11])
Γ |=MKw
3
∆ ⇔
{
Γ |=MCL ∅ or
there is a ∆′ ⊆ ∆ s.t. Γ |=MCL ∆′]and var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ).
28Discomfort with Disjunctive Addition being valid with regard to the comma on the
right, but not with regard to the proper disjunction connective, might be due to an
inclination towards reading the sentences listed in the consequent disjunctively. But this
interpretation of the commas appearing in the conclusions side of a multiple-conclusion
argument is not forced upon us, just like it is not forced either upon those working in
relevant logics—as pointed out, for example, in the reference texts [41] and [36].
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The RTL (right-to-left) direction of the equivalence implies that Kw3 obeys
GWVIC. Since ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |=MKw
3
∅, we have that Kw3 does not obey GVIC or
GVSP. As a consequence, it does not provide a relevant logic of meaningless-
ness. However, the logic obeys the two conditions whenever Γ is (classically)
consistent. In this case, the logic also satisfies GVSP. Thus, we could say
that Kw3 qualifies as a quasi-relevant logic and a quasi-containment logic.
3 A Relevant Logic of Meaninglessness
In this and the next sections, we introduce a relevant logic of meaninglessness
and two other relevant logics that obey component homogeneity. In order
to do so, we need to generalize the notion of a contaminating value that we
(informally) introduced in the previous section. First, we provide a general
notion of contamination:
Definition 8 Given a matrix M, a contamination relation  ⊆ TM × TM
is a relation satisfying the following conditions:
i) i  i ⇒ f¬(i) = i;
ii) i  j ⇒ f∨(i, j) = f∨(j, i) = f∧(, j) = f∧(j, i) = j;
iii) i  j and j  i ⇒ i = j;
iv) i  j and j  l ⇒ i  l;
v) i ≺ j ⇒ i 6= j, where i ≺ j is short for ‘i  j and j 6 i’;
vi) ∀j, l ∈ TM : (∃i ∈ TM : i  j) ⇒ j  l or l  j.
If i  j, we say that j contaminates i. We say that j is a contaminating value
if there is some value i that is contaminated by j. Additionally, we say that
j is non-trivially contaminating if i  j for some i 6= j. Condition i) states
that negation behaves as a fixed point for contaminating values; condition
(ii) states that if j contaminates i, then their disjunction and conjunction
have j as an output. It is easy to see that this extends to any binary op-
eration that is definable in M. The two conditions generalize the behavior
of e from MKw3 to any contaminating value. Notice that any pair of values
from TMEfde violates condition ii): none of t, b, n, f contaminates the other
one. Conditions iii) and iv) state that  is a antisymmetric and transitive,
respectively. A consequence of this is that, if j non-trivially contaminates
i (i  j and i 6= j), then j also strictly contaminates i (that is, i ≺ j). By
contrast, Condition v) implies that a strictly contaminating value is also a
non-trivially contaminating value. Finally, condition vi) states that a value
j is -comparable with all the defined values, if it is -comparable with at
least one of them. In contrapositive form: if a value j is -incomparable
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with some other value l, then j is not a contaminating value (though some
other value may contaminate j). Together with the remark about, this im-
plies that none of the values from TMEfde can be a contaminating value (as
soon as they retain the behavior from Definition 5). The same applies to the
values in TMCL and TMLP (if they behave as per standard definitions). Two
immediate consequences of condition vi) are, first, that any two non-trivially
contaminating values are comparable (∀i, j ∈ TM : (∃l, k ∈ TM : l  i and
k  j) ⇒ j  l or l  j), and, second, that contaminating values are locally
connected (i  j and i  l ⇒ j  l or l  j). Notice, however, that the prop-
erty of global connectedness does not hold: i)–vi) do not imply, together,
that either j  l or l  j.
Second, we sort out the set of the contaminating values in a matrixM:
Definition 9 For every matrixM, CM ⊆ TM is the greatest contamination
set (gcs) of M if and only if:
i ∈ CM ⇔ ∃j ∈ TM : j ≺ i
From the definition and condition vi) from Definition 8, it follows that l ∈
TM \ CM if and only if l is -incomparable with any value j. This implies
that for every value i ∈ CM and j ∈ TM \ CM: j ≺ i, to the effect that
f∨(i, j) = f∨(j, i) = f∧(i, j) = f∧(j, i) = i. As is easy to see, the condition
generalizes to any k-ary operation f◦k(x1, . . . , xk) definable in the given
matrix M. Thus, if xi = i for some contaminating i ∈ CM and xj /∈ CM
for every xj 6= xi, then f◦k(x1, . . . , xk) = i, no matter what the other inputs
are. Also, notice that  is a weak connected order in CM, that is:
1. ∀i ∈ CM : i  i (Reflexivity)
2. ∀i, j, l ∈ CM: i  j and j  l ⇒ i  l (Transitivity)
3. For every i, j ∈ CM, i  j or j  i (Connectedness)
Notice that any (non-trivial) contaminating matrix M where CM < ω has
a value v that obeys CP from Section 2—that is, a greatest contaminating
value v.
Once a general notion of contamination is set, we can define the notion
of a matrix with contaminating values:29
Definition 10 A logical matrix with contaminating values is a tuple 〈TM,
CM,DM,, f¬, f∨, f∧〉 such that:
• 〈TM,DM, f¬, f∨, f∧〉 is a logical matrix as for Definition 2;
• CM ⊆ TM is the (possibly empty) gcs in the matrix.
29As is noticed in [54, p. 290], these notions can be further generalized to apply to a
non-deterministic matrix with contaminating values.
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We will say in what follows that M is non-trivial if CM 6= ∅. Clearly,
the standard Belnap-Dunn four-valued semantics MEfde for Efde is a trivial
logical matrix with contaminating values, since CMEfde = ∅ in both struc-
tures. As for the relations between DM and CM, we have two options:
DM ∩ CM = ∅ and DM ∩ CM 6= ∅.30 In this section, we just consider
systems where DM ∩ CM = ∅—that is, where no contaminating value is
designated. In the next section, by contrast, we also consider systems where
some (and possibly all) contaminating values are designated.
Although in this paper we deal with logics that include at most two
contaminating values, the above definitions apply to any matrix, regardless
of the number of values in CM. For the sake of readability, we denote a
contaminating value by e if it is non-designated, and by a if it is designated.
This will suffice for our purpose, since, in this paper, the only logics to
have more than one contaminating value just include one non-designated
contaminating value and one designated contaminating value.
A useful notation is this: M[e] is the matrix extending M with a non-
designated value e that contaminates all values in TM[e] = TM ∪ {e}.
3.1 A Relevant Logic of Meaninglessness Related to Efde
With this at hand, we are ready to introduce our relevant logic of meaning-
lessness. In particular, we extend the matrix MEfde by adding a contami-
nating (and non-designated) value e. We call S∗fde the resulting logic. This
system has been first introduced by Daniels in [15] as the fde-fragment of his
logic S∗ with ‘story semantics’ for conditionals introduced in [14]; its truth-
functional semantics (below) has been independently introduced by [47] as
a formalization of Buddhist dialectics. In [47], the logic is called FDEϕ and
the contaminating value e is read as ‘ineffable’.
Definition 11 The matrix MS∗fde is the logical matrix with contaminating
values in which:
• TMS∗
fde
= {t, b, n, e, f}
• CMS∗
fde
= {e}
• DMS∗
fde
= {t, b}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
30Also, in the second case we never have CM = DM, since t ∈ DM in all the matrices
we are dealing with.
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f¬
t f
b b
n n
e e
f t
f∨ t b n e f
t t t t e t
b t b t e b
n t t n e n
e e e e e e
f t b n e f
f∧ t b n e f
t t b n e f
b b b f e f
n n f n e f
e e e e e e
f f f f e f
It is clear from the table above that MS∗fde is MEfde [e]. Since MEfde is a
submatrix of MS∗fde , we have that31
Γ |=MS∗
fde
∆ ⇒ Γ |=MEfde ∆
As a consequence, all the invalid inferences of Efde remain invalid in the case
of S∗fde, which turns to be a paraconsistent and paracomplete logic. The
above fact also implies that S∗fde obeys VSP, thus qualifying it as a relevant
logic. Beside, also MKw3 is a submatrix of MS∗fde , to the effect that
Γ |=MS∗
fde
∆ ⇒ Γ |=MKw
3
∆
Together with the fact that Γ 6|=MS∗
fde
∅, this implies that S∗fde obeys GVIC.
Thus, S∗fde also qualifies as a containment logic.
Characterizing S∗fde. Here we characterize MS∗fde-consequence; that is, we
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a set ∆ of formulas to follow
in S∗fde from a set Γ. Interestingly, this reveals the exact relation between
S∗fde and Efde. In particular, we will see that S
∗
fde is the maximal containment
logic generated by Efde. We provide the characterization by proving a more
general result, that enables us to characterize the consequence relation from
any matrixM[e] in terms of the consequence relation ofM and the variable-
inclusion requirement VIC over consequence- and premise-sets:
Theorem 1 For every matrix M, the M[e]-consequence of the correspond-
ing extension M[e] can be characterized as follows:
Γ |=M[e] ∆⇔ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ s.t. Γ |=M ∆′
31M′ = 〈TM′ ,DM′ , f ′¬, f ′∨, f ′∧〉 is a submatrix ofM = 〈TM,DM, f¬, f∨, f∧〉 if TM′ ⊆
TM and the operations in M′ are restrictions of the corresponding operations in M′.
In what follows, we will abuse notation a bit and use the same symbols to denote the
operations in a matrix M and in all its submatrices M′.
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(LTR): We prove this half by contraposition. Assume that for every ∆′ ⊆ ∆,
either var(∆′) * var(Γ) or Γ 2M ∆′. We have two relevant cases:
Case 1): Γ |=M ∅. Since e is non-designated and contaminating, if Γ |=M
∅—that is, if there are no M-valuations under which each formula in Γ is
designated—any ν ∈ VM[e] will either be a valuation ν ∈ VM for M or will
map some atom to e (see [28] for a discussion of this fact). Hence, Γ |=M[e] ∅,
in which case the filter condition will be trivially satisfied.
Case 2): Γ 6|=M ∅. We construct a valuation ν ∈ VM[e] witnessing that
Γ 6|=M[e] ∆. By the condition assumed on ∆, we can split ∆ into two sets,
the set ∆◦ = {ψ ∈ ∆ | var(ψ) * var(Γ)} and its complement ∆• = ∆r∆◦.
Importantly, because var(∆•) ⊆ var(Γ), the initial hypothesis entails that
Γ 2M ∆•. Also, because Γ is by hypothesis satisfiable in M and because
Γ 2M ∆•, there exists a valuation ν ∈ VM such that ν[Γ] ⊆ DM and
ν[∆•] ∩ DM = ∅. Now, from this valuation ν, we define a valuation ν? ∈
VM[e] by the following scheme:
ν?(p) =
{
ν(p) if p ∈ var(Γ)
e otherwise
Now, because ν? agrees with ν with respect to the atoms appearing in Γ,
ν?(Γ) ⊆ DM[e]. Moreover, because var(∆•) ⊆ var(Γ), for each ψ ∈ ∆•,
ν?(ψ) /∈ DM[e]. If ∆◦ = ∅, this suffices to have a countermodel witnessing
that Γ 2M[e] ∆, since, in this case, ∆ = ∆•. If ∆◦ 6= ∅, then we have
ν?(ψ) = e for every ψ ∈ ∆◦, since by construction every ψ ∈ ∆◦ contains
an atom p such that p /∈ var(Γ), to the effect that ν?(p) = e. Because
∆ = ∆• ∪∆◦, ν? provides a countermodel witnessing that Γ 2M[e] ∆.
(RTL): Assume that Γ |=M ∆′ for some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ).
This implies that, for every ν ∈ VM[e], if ν(ϕ) ∈ DM[e] for every ϕ ∈ Γ, then
ν(p) 6= e for every p ∈ var(Γ). Suppose now that ν(ψ) /∈ DM[e] for every
ψ ∈ ∆′ and some ν ∈ VM[e]. Since var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ), this in turn implies
ν(q) 6= e for every q ∈ var(∆′) and ν(ψ) 6= e for every ψ ∈ ∆′. Thus, we have
that, for every ψ ∈ ∆′, ν(ψ) ∈ TM\DM. Under this assumption, we can turn
ν into a ν ′ ∈ VM such that ν ′(p) = ν(p) for every p ∈ var(Γ). This implies
ν ′(ϕ) ∈ DM for every ϕ ∈ Γ and ν(ψ) /∈ DM for every ψ ∈ ∆′. Thus,
the assumption that ν(ψ) /∈ DM[e] for every ψ ∈ ∆′ and some ν ∈ VM[e]
contradicts our initial hypothesis. As a consequence, we have Γ |=M[e] ∆′
and, by this, Γ |=M[e] ∆.
The theorem implies that the subsystem L′ = 〈L, |=M[e]〉 of any logic L =
〈L, |=M〉 satisfies GWVIC, and that L′ satisfies GVIC if L is paraconsistent.
The characterization of S∗fde immediately follows from Theorem 1:
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Corollary 1 Γ |=MS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ s.t.
Γ |=MEfde ∆′
Since MS∗fde-consequence is paraconsistent, Corollary 1 implies that MS∗fde
obeys VIC (beside obeying GVIC). This and Corollary 1 in turn imply the
following characterization of single-conclusion MS∗fde-consequence:
Corollary 2 Γ |=MS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ Γ |=MEfde ψ and var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ)
That is, S∗fde is the greatest containment logic generated by Efde.
Relevance and Meaninglessness. S∗fde gives us what we need for a (basic)
relevant logic of meaninglessness. Contrary to Kw3 , in Sfde we cannot (validly)
infer the meaningless ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, or they do not’
from any inconsistent premise-set. This is due to Corollary 1 together with
the fact that S∗fde is paraconsistent and non-tautological. In particular, these
two features are crucial to secure satisfaction of GVSP (VSP) and design
a relevant system. Beside, S∗fde satisfies GVIC (VIC) to the effect that, for
the true assumption ‘Bob Dylan is a singer’, we cannot validly infer that
‘either Bob Dylan is a singer, or Jack Bruce walks like a bearded rainbow’:
the second disjunct is meaningless, and thus the entire disjunction will be,
due to CH. In a nutshell, S∗fde details the effect of meaningless expressions
on a relevant tool of reasoning (namely, Efde).
3.2 A Further System Obeying GVIC
S∗fde is not the only logic in the literature to obey VIC (and hence, VSP)
and CH. Another such formalism is the system Sfde introduced by Deutsch
in [16], which is investigated by [27] and independently introduced by Oller
[40] as AL. The system is the fde-fragment of the logic S by [17]. Here, we
introduce the system and we briefly discuss why we favor S∗fde over Sfde as a
relevant logic of meaninglessness.
Definition 12 The matrix MSfde is the logical matrix with contaminating
values in which:
• TMSfde = TMS∗fde \ {n}
• CMSfde = {e}
• DMSfde = {t, b}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
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f¬
t f
b b
e e
f t
f∨ t b e f
t t t e t
b t b e b
e e e e e
f t b e f
f∧ t b e f
t t b e f
b b b e f
e e e e e
f f f e f
It is clear by the tables above that MSfde =MLP[e]. By this and Theo-
rem 1, the characterization of |=MSfde follows:
Corollary 3 Γ |=MSfde ∆⇔ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ s.t.
Γ |=MLP ∆′
Interestingly, [27] establishes the characterization of the single-conclusion
version of |=MSfde . The result is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3:
Corollary 4 (Observation 23 by [27]) Γ |=MSfde ψ ⇔ Γ |=MLP ψ and
var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ)
That is, Sfde is the greatest containment logic generated by LP. Just to
get a concrete feeling of how Sfde and S
∗
fde differ: it is easy to check that
ϕ∨ψ |=MSfde ϕ∨¬ϕ and ϕ∨ψ 6|=MS∗fde ϕ∨¬ϕ: designatedness of a disjunc-
tion guarantees determinedness of all disjuncts in Sfde, but not in S
∗
fde.
Sfde obeys GVIC (VIC)—due to Corollary 3—and hence it also obeys
GVSP (VSP). This in turn qualifies it as a relevant logic. Why, then, not
consider Sfde, rather than S
∗
fde, as a relevant logic of meaninglessness? The
reason is that a relevant logic of meaninglessness captures how meaningless
sentences affect a relevantist tool of reasoning. Thus, we wish to start from
a basic layer providing our general relevantist reasoning, and let some of its
inferences fail because of the presence of meaningless expressions—without
this additional layer, the inferences in question would be valid. Sfde does
not fit in this picture, though. In it, the ‘basic layer’ is provided by LP:
the inferences that would hold if we had no meaningless expressions are the
LP-valid ones, and LP is not a relevant logic. Thus, Sfde does not match the
purpose of building a logic of meaninglessness ‘on top’ of a relevantist tool
of reasoning.
3.3 Comment on Theorem 1
The relevance of Theorem 1 goes beyond the investigation of a relevant logic
of meaninglessness: the result is of interest for the logic of meaninglessness
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project by [6] and the containment logic project by [42]. In particular, it
gives a more general insight on the fact, highlighted by [28], that there is
a connection between the two families of systems. A short overview in re-
cently established results will help understand the relevance of Theorem 1
for the two projects.
Existing Results. The results from [11, 41, 56] clarify how logical conse-
quence works in the basic logic of meaninglessness by [6]. [11, Theorem 3.4]
characterizes the general (multiple/multiple) relation of Kw3 -consequence;
the characterizations of the multiple/single case by [56, Theorem 2.3.1] and
the single-premise/single-conclusion case—the fde-fragment—by [41, Theo-
rem 1f ] follow as corollaries of that theorem. All these theorems establish
classical validity and the weak variable-inclusion requirements from GWVIC
or WVIC as jointly sufficient and individually necessary conditions for an
inference to be Kw3 -valid.
The results from [28, 27] characterize the multiple/single case of Sfde and
S∗fde—the main non-tautological systems of containment logic—and estab-
lish that the strong variable-inclusion requirement from VIC together with
LP- and Efde-validity are jointly sufficient and individually necessary for an
inference to be Sfde- and S
∗
fde-valid, respectively. The characterizations by
[11, 41, 56] make an essential use of the disjunctive clauses ‘Γ |=MCL ∅’,
since
∨
ϕ∈Γ ϕ∧¬ϕ |=MKw
3
ψ is valid in Kw3 (for every Γ ⊆ L and ψ ∈ L) and
yet may escape the variable-inclusion requirement var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ). By
contrast, the characterizations by [28, 27] do not need the clause.
Since characterization results in some sense tell us what a logic is, the
dispensability/indispensability of the disjunctive clause Γ |= ∅ in the above
results may induce readings of Bochvar’s logic of meaninglessness and non-
tautological systems of containment logic (such as Sfde and S
∗
fde) as two
overall different kinds of business.
Insight from Theorem 1. Theorem 1 counters the above conclusion, in
that it secures a uniform recipe to characterize both Kw3 and containment
systems like Sfde and S
∗
fde. The theorem applies to K
w
3 , sinceMKw3 =MCL[e],
and it has an interesting consequence: if we upgrade to multiple/multiple
consequence, then the disjunctive clause Γ |=MCL ∅ is dispensable in the
characterization of Kw3 . The crucial point is that the clause of the right
side of (the statement of) Theorem 1 leaves the option open that ∆′ =
∅—since ∅ ⊆ var(Γ) for every Γ ⊆ L. This is perfectly compatible with∨
ϕ∈Γ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |=MKw
3
∅, which is in turn secured by Theorem 1, MKw3 =
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MCL[e] and
∨
ϕ∈Γ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |=MCL ∅. When it comes to Sfde and S∗fde, the
option that ∆′ = ∅ is excluded by the fact that
∨
ϕ∈Γ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=LP ∅ and∨
ϕ∈Γ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=MEfde ∅. In sum, the same mechanism explains both the
similarities between Kw3 and the pair Sfde/S
∗
fde—satisfaction of the refined
inclusion requirement from Theorem 1—and their differences—that is, the
respective behaviors with respect to ECQ.
The import of Theorem 1 on the relations between logic Kw3 of meaning-
lessness and non-tautological containment systems is clear: the difference in
the syntactic restrictions realized by the two families of logics—GWVIC and
GVIC, respectively—is just a by-product of the way their ‘initial logics’—
CL or LP and Efde, in our case—relate to paraconsistency. In a nutshell,
the difference is due to a difference in the initial logics. This suggests to
see Bochvar’s basic logic of meaningless and containment logic as different
members of just one family—namely, the family of systems that are gen-
erated by any many-valued setting by satisfaction of the variable-inclusion
requirement reported in Theorem 1.
Containment logics and paraconsistent logics of meaninglessness.
[28, Observation 1] shows that paraconsistent logics of meaninglessness obey-
ing CH also obey VIC, thus qualifying as systems of containment logic. The-
orem 1 naturally extends the observation to GVIC and the multiple/multiple
case. Observation 1 from [28] and its generalization by Theorem 1 prove sig-
nificant at the crossing of logic of meaninglessness and containment logic,
since the two results involve all non-tautological containment systems that
have a natural many-valued semantics and are defined on a standard (i.e.,
Tarskian) relation of consequence.32
If we hold that meaninglessness needs a contaminating (and also non-
designated) value to be represented, as [6, 10, 33] do, then Theorem 1 also
gives a semantic recipe to generate logics of meaninglessness out of any
many-valued logic. This makes a further progress with respect to Obser-
vation 1 by [28]. Indeed, the observation gives us a semantic recipe to
generate a paraconsistent logic of meaninglessness—the recipe being: add a
(non-designated) contaminating value e to an initial paraconsistent many-
valued logic. By contrast, Theorem 1 tells us how we can generate a logic
32Some non-tautological systems of containment logic, such as RC described by John-
son in [37], are based on a non-standard definition of consequence, which in turn grants
connexivity. Although this choice is legitimate, we consider the standard definition of
consequence more natural, whence our decision to focus on containment systems like Sfde
and S∗fde rather than systems like RC.
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of meaninglessness out of any many-valued logic whatsoever.33 To be sure,
Observation 1 by [28] keeps proving interesting for a number of reasons.
Just to mention one: non-tautological systems of containment logic can be
seen as paraconsistent logics of meaninglessness.34 This has two interesting
consequences.
First, it tells us that, despite the different philosophical motivations,
there is a strong connection between the containment project and the mean-
inglessness project, to the effect that a number of systems fit the formal
trademarks of both projects. The occasional path-crossing in the two projects
and the similarity among their systems are not casual; rather, they are the
signs of a profound similarity.
Second, Theorem 1 provides a general recipe to build containment log-
ics. This recipe is based on the presence of a non-designated contami-
nating value like e, which turns to be a sort of semantic complement to
the ‘double-barrelled’ characterization of containment systems—the latter
in turn restricts an independently defined notion of consequence by a syn-
tactical requirement.35 Since the contaminating value has a natural and
independently motivated reading as ‘meaningless’, Theorem 1 guarantees
that non-tautological containment systems come with a feasible semantic
insight, and are not just a syntactic adjustment of an otherwise motivated
relation of consequence. This will prove especially relevant in Section 6,
where we discuss a criticism by Routley to the semantic insight carried by
containment logic.
4 Related Formalisms/First-Degree Entailments
In this section, we discuss three systems that obey CH but include a desig-
nated contaminating value, contrary to the tenets proposed by Routley and
Goddard for a logic of meaninglessness. We call these systems dS∗fde, crossS
∗
fde
and crossdS∗fde, and we denote their designated contaminating value by a.
In particular, dS∗fde extends matrix MEfde with a, crossS∗fde extends matrix
MS∗fde with a, and crossdS∗fde extendsMdS∗fde with a non-designated contami-
33Here, we confine ourselves to containment systems whose consequence relation obeys
Definition 4, such as Sfde or S
∗
fde, as opposed to e.g. Johnson’s RC.
34Of course, this does not imply that we have to see containment systems as (paracon-
sistent) logics of meaninglessness: the key point in our result is the formal behavior of the
contaminating value e, not its informal interpretation as meaningless. But the view comes
with interesting perspectives, in our opinion (see remarks below).
35The label is coined by Routley in [51]; this aspect of containment logic is also the
focus of the famous Go¨del’s conjecture that we briefly discuss in Section 6.
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nating value e. Thus, in analyzing the logics crossS∗fde and crossdS
∗
fde we will
be looking at six-valued logics with two contaminating values, i.e. a and e.
These systems have been previously introduced in [54], respectively, as the
logics Lnbb′ , Lnbb′e and Lnebb′ .
Designation of a contaminating value has been first proposed by [35],
which aim at providing an alternative project on meaninglessness (see be-
low). In Hallde´n’s reading, the designated contaminating value indeed rep-
resented meaninglessness. This in turn implies that we would sometimes
assert nonsense, contrary to the reasonable intuition by [9, 10, 32, 33]. Our
interest for dS∗fde and crossS
∗
fde is mainly mathematical. In particular, we
keep ourselves neutral on the tenability of Hallde´n’s reading of the value a
as a representation of meaninglessness.
A useful notation is this: M[a] is the matrix extending a given matrixM
with a designated value a that contaminates all values in TM[a] = TM ∪{a}.
4.1 Another Efde-Based Logic Obeying Component Homo-
geneity
The logic dS∗fde is determined by extending the matrix MEfde from Defini-
tion 5 with the designated contaminating value a. In turn, this results in
dS∗fde being the dual of S
∗
fde from Section 3—see Proposition 2 below. This
logic was first introduced in [54] as the logic Lnbb′ .
Definition 13 The matrix MdS∗fde is the logical matrix with contaminating
values in which:
• TMdS∗
fde
= {t, b, a, n, f}
• CMdS∗
fde
= {a}
• DMdS∗
fde
= {t, b, a}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
f¬
t f
b b
n n
a a
f t
f∨ t b n a f
t t t t a t
b t b t a b
n t t n a n
a a a a a a
f t b n a f
f∧ t b n a f
t t b n a f
b b b f a f
n n f n a f
a a a a a a
f f f f a f
It is clear from the table above that MdS∗fde is MEfde [a], which implies that,
if Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆, then Γ |=MEfde ∆. This suffices to qualify dS∗fde as a paracon-
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sistent and paracomplete logic obeying VSP (and more in general, GVSP).
The following fact will prove helpful in what follows:
Proposition 2 dS∗fde and S
∗
fde are dual to one another, that is:
Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆ ⇔ ∆¬ |=MS∗
fde
Γ¬
where, for every Γ ⊆ L, Γ¬ = {¬ϕ ∈ L | ϕ ∈ Γ}.
(LTR): Assume Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆. Consider the following sets:
Xν = {ϕ ∈ L | ν(ϕ) = b}
Yν = {ϕ ∈ L | ν(ϕ) = n}
Zν = {ϕ ∈ L | ν(ϕ) = e}
Uν = {ϕ ∈ L | ν(ϕ) = {t, f}}
For every ν ∈ VMS∗
fde
, we can build a valuation ν ′ ∈ VMdS∗
fde
such that:
1. For every p ∈ var(Xν∪Yν), ν ′(p) = n if ν(p) = b, ν ′(p) = b if ν(p) = n,
and ν ′(p) = ν(p) otherwise;
2. For every p ∈ var(Zν), ν ′(p) = a if ν(p) = e, and ν ′(p) = ν(p) other-
wise;
3. For every p ∈ var(Uν), ν ′(p) = ν(p).
Given the behavior of truth operations from Definition 11 and Definition 13,
it is clear that, for every ϕ,ψ ∈ L, (1) if ν(ϕ) = b and ν(ψ) = n, then
ν ′(ϕ) = n and ν ′(ψ) = b, (2) if ν(ϕ) = e, then ν ′(ϕ) = a, and (3) ν ′(ϕ) =
ν(ϕ) otherwise. Suppose now that ∆¬ 6|=MS∗
fde
Γ¬. This implies that there
is a ν ∈ VMS∗
fde
such that ν(ψ) ∈ {t, b} for every ψ ∈ ∆¬ and ν(ϕ) ∈ {f, n, e}
for every ϕ ∈ Γ¬. Equivalently, there is a ν ∈ VMS∗
fde
such that ν(ψ) ∈ {f, b}
for every ψ ∈ ∆ and ν(ϕ) ∈ {t, n, e} for every ϕ ∈ Γ. By the above, this in
turn implies that there is a ν ′ ∈ VMdS∗
fde
such that ν ′(ψ) ∈ {f, n} for every
ψ ∈ ∆ and ν ′(ϕ) ∈ {t, b, a} for every ϕ ∈ Γ. But this contradicts the initial
assumption that Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆.
(RTL): Assume ∆¬ |=MS∗
fde
Γ¬. Suppose that Γ 6|=MdS∗
fde
∆. This implies
that, for some ν ∈ VMdS∗
fde
, ν(ϕ) ∈ {t, b, a} for every ϕ ∈ Γ and ν(ψ) ∈
{f, n} for every ψ ∈ ∆. Equivalently, we have that ν(¬ϕ) ∈ {f, b, a} for
every ¬ϕ ∈ Γ¬ and ν(¬ψ) ∈ {t, n} for every ¬ψ ∈ ∆¬. By dualizing the
construction above, it is easy to see that, for every ϕ,ψ ∈ L and ν ∈ VMdS∗
fde
,
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there is a valuation ν ′ ∈ VMdS∗
fde
such that (1) if ν(ϕ) = n and ν(ψ) = b,
then ν ′(ϕ) = b and ν ′(ψ) = n, (2) if ν(ϕ) = a, then ν ′(ϕ) = e, and (3)
ν ′(ϕ) = ν(ϕ) otherwise. By this and the above ν ∈ VMdS∗
fde
, we conclude
that there is a ν ′ ∈ VMdS∗
fde
such that ν(¬ϕ) ∈ {f, n, e} for every ¬ϕ ∈ Γ¬
and ν(¬ψ) ∈ {t, b} for every ¬ψ ∈ ∆¬. But this contradicts the initial
assumption.
Proposition 2 gives us a general recipe to individuate valid inferences
and failures in S∗fde. Since DA fails in S
∗
fde (which is a subsystem of K
w
3 ), we
have that Conjunction Simplification (CS) fails in dS∗fde:
36
ϕ ∧ ψ 6|=MdS∗
fde
ϕ CS
but notice that the following multiple-premise version of CS holds:
ϕ,ψ |=MdS∗
fde
ϕ CS′
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 together imply a characterization result for
dS∗fde:
Corollary 5 Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t.
Γ′ |=MEfde ∆
It is clear by the corollary that dS∗fde obeys neither GVIC nor GWVIC.
Rather, it obeys a dual condition, a sort of reverse GVIC:
Γ |=L ∆ ⇒ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some non-empty Γ′ ⊆ Γ (RGVIC)
Hallde´n’s Project for a Logic of Meaninglessness. The idea of having
a designated contaminating value dates back to [35], where Hallde´n pursues
a paraconsistent logic of meaninglessness. In particular, the basic system
PWK is the ‘internal’ fragment of Hallde´n’s logic of nonsense. This logic,
nowadays referred to paraconsistent weak Kleene [7, 12, 11, 54] is obtained
by redefining the matrix from Definition 7 with the designated a instead of
the non-designated e:
Definition 14 The matrix MPWK is the logical matrix with contaminating
values in which:
• TMPWK = {t, a, f}
• DMPWK = {t, a}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ are as per Definition 7, with a replacing e
36To illustrate this feature: ϕ∧ψ will receive value a also in valuations where ψ receives
a and ϕ receive f.
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PWK is the dual of Kw3 —a straightforward adaptation of the proof of
Proposition 2 suffices to see this. Together with the paraconsistency of
PWK, this secures failure of CS and validity of CS′, as with dS∗fde. Also,
duality with Kw3 guarantees that all and only classical tautologies are valid
in PWK, and it implies the following characterization of PWK:
Proposition 3 (Theorem 3.4 by [11])
Γ |=MPWK ∆ ⇔

∅ |=MCL ∆ or
Γ |=MCL ∆ and var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some non-empty
Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t. Γ′ |=MCL ∆.
It is clear from the fact thatMPWK is a submatrix ofMdS∗fde , that if Γ |=MS∗fde
∆, then Γ |=MPWK ∆. Also, Proposition 3 and Corollary 5 give an immediate
insight in the differences between PWK and dS∗fde:
37
∅ |=MPWK ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ∅ 6|=MdS∗
fde
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |=MPWK ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ 6|=MdS∗
fde
ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ |=MPWK ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ϕ ∨ ψ 6|=MdS∗
fde
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
More generally, the theorem implies that PWK does not obey the reverse
containment requirement from RGVIC, but a weaker reverse of the general
weak variable-inclusion requirement GWVIC:
Γ |=L ∆ ⇒
{
∅ |=L ∆, or
var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some non-empty Γ′ ⊆ Γ
(RGWVIC)
Hallde´n’s view on meaninglessness differs consistently from the one by
Routley and Goddard. While Routley and Goddard’s focus is on not as-
serting nonsense, Hallde´n’s focus is on guarding against the drawing of false
conclusions out of premises that are not false. This difference in focus is
due, apparently, to different views on the relation between assertion, truth,
and meaninglessness—see [27, p. 344–345]. Of course, the choice by Hallde´n
37To provide an illustration of this feature: as for the first line, ν(¬ϕ) ∈ {t, a} iff
ν(ϕ) ∈ {f, a}, which secures that LEM is valid in PWK; in dS∗fde, LEM fails for the same
reason as Efde. As for the second line, ν(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ DPWK if and only if ν(ϕ) = a; thus,
by ν(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ DPWK and the contaminating nature of a, we have ν(ϕ ∧ ψ) = a. By
contrast, ν(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ DdS∗
fde
if and only if ν(ϕ) = {b, a}. If ν(ψ) = f and ν(ϕ) = b, then
ν(ϕ ∧ ψ) /∈ DdS∗
fde
. As for the third line, if follows from validity of LEM in PWK. In dS∗fde,
the rule fails for the same reason as Efde or S
∗
fde.
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raises questions of the tenability of PWK qua logic of meaninglessness. For
instance: Should we admit a ‘meaningless’ value as designated?—or equiv-
alently: Could we legitimately assert nonsense? Can the designated value a
be read as ‘meaningless’? Hallde´n would answer all these questions in the
affirmative, while Brady, Goddard and Routley would reply for the negative.
That being said, the questions above are not particularly pressing for this
paper, and we do not take a stance on them here: our focus on dS∗fde and the
systems below is merely mathematical. Importantly, we do not commit to
reading a as ‘meaningless’, although we believe that Hallde´n’s motivations
for that option would deserve more attention. Be that as it may, we believe
that the technical insights we provide in this section can be fruitful both
to the supporters of Hallde´n’s philosophical view on nonsense, and to those
who are merely interested in exploring mathematical features of logics like
PWK and dS∗fde—examples of the latter are [7, 54].
A General Characterization Result. Corollary 5 is a special case of a
general recipe for the characterization of any logic including a designated
greatest contaminating value:
Theorem 2 Let M[a] be the matrix extending a many-valued matrix M
with a designated value a that contaminates all values in TM[a] = TM∪{a}.
Then M[a]-consequence can be characterized as follows:
Γ |=M[a] ∆⇔ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t. Γ′ |=M ∆
(LTR): As for Theorem 1, we prove this direction by proving the contra-
positive. Suppose that for any Γ′ ⊆ Γ, either var(Γ′) * var(∆) or Γ′ 2M ∆.
We may split Γ into two sets: Γ• = {ψ ∈ Γ | var(ψ) * var(∆)} and
Γ◦ = Γ r Γ•. By construction, var(Γ◦) ⊆ var(∆), whence Γ◦ 2M ∆, and
we fix anM-valuation ν witnessing the failure of this inference. From ν, we
again define an M[a]-valuation ν?:
ν?(p) =
{
ν(p) if p ∈ var(∆)
a otherwise
Because ν? restricted to the atoms of ∆—and a fortiori to the atoms of Γ◦—
is coextensional with ν, we know that ν?(∆) ∩ DM[a] = ∅ while ν?(Γ◦) ⊆
DM[a]. If Γ• = ∅, this suffices to have a countermodel witnessing that
Γ 6|=M[a] ∆, since, in this case, Γ = Γ◦. If Γ• 6= ∅, since a contaminates all
other values, by construction we have that ν?(Γ•) = {a} ⊆ DM[a]. Hence,
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ν? maps every formula of Γ = Γ◦ ∪Γ• to a designated value yet fails to map
any ψ ∈ ∆ to a designated value, i.e., ν? witnesses that Γ 6|=M[a] ∆.
(RTL): Assume that there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for which
Γ′ |=M ∆. If Γ′ = ∅, since DM = DM[a] and a contaminates every other
value, then a countermodel to every ψ ∈ ∆ in M[a] is, when restricted to
the variables in ∆, a countermodel to every ψ ∈ ∆ in M. If Γ′ 6= ∅, then
for any M[a]-valuation ν such that ν(Γ′) ⊆ DM[a], if a ∈ ν(∆) then some
ψ ∈ ∆ is assigned a designated value by ν. Otherwise—if a /∈ ν(∆)—then
because all atoms appearing in Γ′ appear in ∆, also a /∈ ν(Γ′). Hence, ν
restricted to the atoms appearing in ∆ is essentially an M-valuation, and
the fact that Γ′ |=M ∆ ensures that ν(ψ) ∈ DM for some ψ ∈ ∆. Hence, in
either case we conclude that Γ′ |=M[a] ∆ and a fortiori that Γ |=M[a] ∆.
Comment on Theorem 2. Theorem 2 guarantees a uniform recipe for
characterizing many-valued logic obeying RGWVIC and RGVIC, as The-
orem 2 does with many-valued logics obeying GWVIC and GVIC, respec-
tively. As with Theorem 1, Theorem 2 shows that the differences between
(many-valued) logics obeying RGWVIC and RGVIC is just a by-product
of some property of the ‘initial’ consequence relation |=M. In particular, if
|=M is paracomplete, thenM[a] will determine a sort of reverse containment
logic obeying RGVIC—as already established in [54, p. 296-297]. Other-
wise, it will determine a logic obeying the weaker RGWVIC, like PWK. Of
course, in a dual way with respect to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 provides a se-
mantic recipe to built out reverse-containment systems out of many-valued
systems—addition of a top value like a to a paracomplete logic |=M results
in a logic that obeys RGVIC. Similarly, it allows us to follow a purely se-
mantic route in order to generate logics obeying RGWVIC like PWK, should
we pursue paraconsistent (and not paracomplete) logics of meaninglessness
in the style of Hallde´n.
A further system satisfying RGVIC. Again, dS∗fde is not the only many-
valued logic obeying RGVIC. The following system, dubbed dSfde, is the
dual of Sfde, obtained by extending the three-valued matrix for K3 with a
designated contaminating value a.
Definition 15 The matrix MdSfde is the logical matrix with contaminating
values in which:
• TMdSfde = TMdS∗fde \ {b}
• CMdSfde = {a}
• DMdSfde = {t, a}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
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f¬
t f
a a
n n
f t
f∨ t a n f
t t a t t
a a a a a
n t a n n
f t a n f
f∧ t a n f
t t a n f
a a a a a
n n a n f
f f a f f
Just like K3 is the dual of LP, and K
w
3 is the dual of PWK, similar
reasoning suffices to guarantee that dSfde is the dual of Sfde. Furthermore,
it is clear by the tables above that MdSfde =MK3 [a]. From Theorem 2, we
have that
Corollary 6 Γ |=MdSfde ∆ ⇔ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t.
Γ′ |=K3 ∆
That is, dSfde is the greatest reverse-containment logic generated by K3.
4.2 Two Efde-Based Logics with Two Contaminating Values
The logic crossS∗fde is determined by a matrix that extends MdS∗fde from
Definition 13 with value e. This logic was introduced in [54] as the system
Lnbb′e.
Definition 16 The matrix McrossS∗fde is the logical matrix with contaminat-
ing values in which:
• TMcrossS∗
fde
= TMdS∗
fde
∪ {e}
• CMcrossS∗
fde
= {a, e}, with a  e
• DMcrossS∗
fde
= {t, b, a}
• f¬, f∨, f∧ behave as illustrated in the following table:
f¬
t f
b b
n n
a a
e e
f t
f∨ t b n a e f
t t t t a e t
b t b t a e b
n t t n a e n
a a a a a e a
e e e e e e e
f t b n a e f
f∧ t b n a e f
t t b n a e f
b b b f a e f
n n f n a e f
a a a a a e a
e e e e e e e
f f f f a e f
We immediately go to the characterization of crossS∗fde, which follows as
a special case of Theorem 1:
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Corollary 7 Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some ∆′ ⊆ ∆ s.t.
Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆′
To give a feeling for this, consider that ϕ1∧ϕ2, ϕ3 6|=McrossS∗
fde
ϕ1, ϕ3∨ϕ4—any
valuation ν ∈ VcrossS∗fde where ν(ϕ1) = f, ν(ϕ2) = a, ν(ϕ3) = DcrossS∗fde and
ν(ϕ4) = e is a counterexample. Corollary 7 explains the failure: the inference
is valid in dS∗fde (since ϕ3 |=MdS∗
fde
ϕ3 ∨ ϕ4),38 but the variable-inclusion
requirement from the Corollary is not met: consider that ℘({ϕ1, ϕ3∨ϕ4}) =
{∅, {ϕ1}, {ϕ3∨ϕ4}, {ϕ1, ϕ3∨ϕ4}}. ∅ is the only member of ℘({ϕ1, ϕ3∨ϕ4})
to be a subset of {ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ3}, but of course ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ3 6|=MdS∗
fde
∅, since
every formula has a model in dS∗fde. Corollary 5 and Corollary 7 together
imply another way to characterize crossS∗fde, which unravels its connection
to Efde:
Corollary 8 Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ) for some
∆′ ⊆ ∆ and Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t. Γ′ |=MEfde ∆′
The nesting of variable-inclusion requirements is intricate enough to make
this alternative look very abstract, but the characterization will prove useful
in understanding the single-premise/single-conclusion version of |=McrossS∗
fde
below. Also, while Corollary 7 hints at a mix of GVIC and RGVIC for
crossS∗fde, Corollary 8 shows how exactly the two requirements mix up. Also,
notice that crossS∗fde obeys VIC: from Corollary 8, it follows that Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
ϕ ⇒ var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ).
Alternatively, we now consider the logic crossdS∗fde, which is determined
by the matrix that extends MS∗fde from Defintion 11 with value a. That is,McrossdS∗fde is exactly as per Definition 16 except that e  a. This logic was
introduced in [54] as the system Lnebb′ . By Theorem 2, we have that:
Corollary 9 Γ |=McrossdS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t.
Γ′ |=MdS∗
fde
∆
Corollary 5 and Corollary 9 together imply:
Corollary 10 Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆⇔ var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆) for some
∆′ ⊆ ∆ and Γ′ ⊆ Γ s.t. Γ′ |=MEfde ∆′
38Notice that the inference is also valid in S∗fde (since ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 |=MS∗
fde
ϕ1). As a conse-
quence, the failure shows that crossS∗fde is not the intersection of S
∗
fde and dS
∗
fde. The same
applies to the logic crossdS∗fde below.
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5 Single-Premise/Single-Conclusion Consequence
In this section, we present some results concerning the single-premise/single-
conclusion version of MS∗fde , MdS∗fde , McrossS∗fde and McrossdS∗fde . An espe-
cially interesting point is the connection between the single/single version
of McrossS∗fde , McrossdS∗fde and the fde-fragment [41] of the Logic of Equality
Eq by [25].
Corollary 1, Corollary 5, Corollary 8 provide an immediate characteri-
zation of the single/single case of MS∗fde , MdS∗fde , McrossS∗fde and McrossdS∗fde ,
respectively:
Corollary 11
1) ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MEfde ψ and var(ψ) ⊆ var(ϕ)
2) ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MEfde ψ and var(ϕ) ⊆ var(ψ)
3) ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MEfde ψ and var(ϕ) = var(ψ)
4) ϕ |=McrossdS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MEfde ψ and var(ϕ) = var(ψ)
As for 1: it follows from ℘({ψ}) = {∅, {ψ}}, Γ 6|=MEfde ∅ for every
Γ ⊆ L, and Corollary 1. As for 2: it follows from ∅ 6|=MEfde ∆ for
every ∆ ⊆ L, ℘({ϕ}) = {∅, {ϕ}} and Corollary 5. As per 3: it follows
from Corollary 8 and the combination of the facts about ℘({ϕ}), ℘({ψ}),
paraconsistency and non-tautologicity of Efde. Similarly for item 4.
A corollary of Observation 1.1 and Observation 1.2 is:
Corollary 12
ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ (ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ and ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
ψ) ⇔ ϕ |=McrossdS∗
fde
ψ
This implies that the first-degree fragments of the logics Lnbb′e and Lnebb′
from [54] coincide. Notice, furthermore, that the variable-inclusion require-
ments from Corollary 8 and Corollary 10 do not collapse into var(Γ) =
var(∆). Indeed, for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we have Γ, ϕ |=M ϕ for M ∈
{McrossS∗fde ,McrossdS∗fde}, even in case var(ϕ) 6= var(Γ).
Connections Among the Different Cases. In S∗fde (and Sfde), the comma
‘on the right’ of an inference does not behave as disjunction—see failure of
DA and validity of DA′. Dually, in dS∗fde the comma ‘on the left’ does not
behave as conjunction—see failure of CS and validity of CS′. In crossS∗fde,
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the two features combine. This mismatch between linguistic and metalin-
guistic items has an import when it comes to the relations among the mul-
tiple/multiple, multiple/single, and single/single versions of MS∗fde , MdS∗fde ,McrossS∗fde . In particular:
Observation 1
1)
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
∆ ⇔ Γ |=MS∗
fde
∆
2)
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ ⇒
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
∆
3)
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
∆ 6⇒ ∧ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ
As per 1: For every ν ∈ VS∗fde , we have ν(
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ) ∈ DS∗fde iff ν(ϕ) ∈ DS∗fde
for every ϕ ∈ Γ. Hence, VS∗fde(
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ) =
⋂
ϕ∈Γ VS∗fde(ϕ). This implies 1. As
per 2: for every ν ∈ VS∗fde , if ν(ψ) 6= e for every ψ ∈ ∆ and ν(ζ) ∈ DS∗fde for
some ζ ∈ ∆, then ν(∨ψ∈∆ ψ) ∈ DS∗fde and ν ∈ ⋃ψ∈∆ VS∗fde(ψ). This implies
2. As per 3: any valuation ν ∈ VS∗fde such that ν(ψi) ∈ DS∗fde and ν(ψj) = e
for ψi, ψj ∈ ∆ is such that ν(
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ) = e. This implies 3.
A look at the proof suffices to see that the observation equally holds for Sfde.
By Observation 1 and the duality between S∗fde and dS
∗
fde, it folllows that:
Observation 2
1) Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ ⇒ Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∆
2)
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ ⇒ Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ
3) Γ |=MdS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ 6⇒
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ
From Observation 1, Observation 2 and the fact that crossS∗fde is weaker
than S∗fde and dS
∗
fde, we have:
Observation 3
1)
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ ⇒ Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆
2) Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆ 6⇒ ∧ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆
3) Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
∆ 6⇒ ∧ϕ∈Γ ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
∨
ψ∈∆ ψ
Observation 1 implies that, in S∗fde, the multiple/multiple case cannot
be reduced to the multiple/single case; Observation 1.1 implies that, by
contrast, the multiple/single case can be reduced to the single/single case.
Dually, Observation 2 implies that, in dS∗fde, the multiple/single and mul-
tiple/multiple cases do not reduce to the single/single and single/multiple
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cases, respectively; also, it is easy to check that the single/multiple case re-
duces to the single/single case. Observation 3 combines this, thus implying
that, in crossS∗fde, neither the multiple/single case nor the multiple/multiple
case reduce to the single/single case. Similar remarks can be provided for
the case of crossdS∗fde. We leave these cases as an exercise to the reader.
5.1 On First-Degree Entailments
The single-premise/single-conclusion restriction of a consequence relation
enjoys a strict connection with the project of determining first-degree en-
tailment (fde-) fragments of logics of sort. First-degree entailments have
been originally devised as a way to internalize consequence (or derivabil-
ity) within the language of a given logic [1]. This is done by extending L
to L via a primitive conditional  and imposing the following syntactic
restriction:39
(SR) ϕ ψ ∈ L if ϕ,ψ ∈ L and ϕ and ψ contain no occurrence of  .
We skip details here, and refer the reader to [41] for a semantic (and many-
valued) framework for first-degree entailments. A system of first-degree
entailment is built in order to be the fragment L of an independently de-
fined system L. In particular,  is designed in order to satisfy the following
equivalence:
(∗) ∅ |=L ϕ ψ ⇔ ϕ |=L ψ
The equivalence states that valid conditionals in L can be reduced to those
valid inferences from L that contain no conditional, and vice versa. In turn,
this implies that we can dispense introduction of and treat fde-fragments
as the single/single version of the restriction of L to L. This has become usual
practice, and it explains the claim that S∗fde and Sfde are the fde-fragment of
S∗ from [14] and and S from [17], respectively.
A notable drawback of is that the restriction forbids nesting and this,
in turn, sounds ad hoc, since it is just motivated by the need to internalize
consequence somehow. Thus, the expressive limitations imposed by the
syntactic clause do not seem to be balanced by a convincing insight on the
conditional. This is why we have preferred the ‘single/single’ treatment
of fde-fragments like S∗fde and Sfde here. However, the conditional  is not
entirely devoid of interest here. Indeed, it allows to design a logic that obeys
VIC→ rather than VIC. As is easy to see, for instance:
39The fde-conditional is usually denoted by ⇒. In this paper, however, we prefer to use
the symbol  , since we use ⇒ for the derivability relation between sequents (section 7).
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∅ |=S∗ 
∧
ϕ∈Γ ϕ ψ ⇒ var(ψ) ⊆ var(Γ)
follows from (∗), Observation 1.1, and Corollary 1 for every Γ ⊆ L and
ψ ∈ L.
5.2 Approaching the First-Degree Fragment of the Logic of
Equality
Epstein [25] presents a Logic of Equality Eq where antecedent and consequent
of a valid conditional share exactly the same information: if |=Eq ϕ → ψ,
then var(ϕ) = var(ψ). In [41], Paoli gives a characterization of the fde-
fragment Eq of Eq:
Proposition 4 (Theorem 1d by [41]) ∅ |=Eq ϕ ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MCL ψ
and var(ϕ) = var(ψ)
From this, Corollary 11.4 and the fact that Efde is weaker than CL, we have
that if ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ, then ∅ |=Eq ϕ ψ. Also:
Observation 4
∅ |=Eq ϕ ψ 6⇒ Γ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ and ∅ |=Eq ϕ ψ 6⇒ Γ |=McrossdS∗
fde
ψ
By a counterexample: ∅ |=Eq (p∧¬p)∧ (q ∨¬q) (p∧¬p)∧ (q ∧¬q),
due to Proposition 4, and (p∧¬p)∧(q∨¬q) 2crossS∗fde (p∧¬p)∧(q∧¬q)—since
the inference is not valid in Efde. From this and Corollary 12, it follows that
the inference is also invalid in crossdS∗fde.
From this and Corollary 11, we have that the single-premise/single-conclusion
version of McrossS∗fde (or McrossdS∗fde) provides the greatest Efde-fragment of
Eq , i.e. the first-degree fragment of Epstein’s Logic of Equality Eq. In
other words,
ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ ⇔ (ϕ |=MEfde ψ and |=Eq ϕ ψ)⇔ ϕ |=McrossdS∗fde ψ
5.3 Generalizing the Results
Here, we generalize the results from Corollary 11.
Proposition 5 Let M be a contaminating matrix based on MEfde such that
(i) CM 6= ∅, (ii) TM = TMEfde ∪ CM, and (iii) CM ∩ DM = ∅. Then:
ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ.
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If C = {e}, thenM =MS∗fde . By contrast, suppose that CM = {e}∪ {e1},
where e1 is a non-designated contaminating value. From Theorem 1, it
follows that ϕ |=M ψ iff ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ and var(ψ) ⊆ var(ϕ). Since var(ψ) ⊆
var(ϕ) holds for every ϕ,ψ ∈ L such that that ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ, we have that
ϕ |=M ψ iff ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ. By iterating this construction, we prove the same
result for the case whereMM = {e}∪{e1, e2, . . . }, with e1, e2, . . . a sequence
of non-designated contaminating values.
Proposition 6 Let M be a contaminating matrix based on MEfde such that
(i) TM = TMEfde ∪ CM, (ii) CM∩DM 6= ∅, and (iii) DM \CM 6= ∅. Then:
ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
ψ.
By duality of S∗fde and dS
∗
fde.
Proposition 7 Let M be a contaminating matrix based on MEfde such that
TM = TMEfde ∪ CM; (ii) CM ∩ TM \ DM 6= ∅, (iii) CM ∩DM 6= ∅, and (iv)DM \ CM 6= ∅. Then:
ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ and ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=McrossdS∗
fde
ψ
If CM = {a, e} and a  e, then M is McrossS∗fde . The same if e  a,
due to Corollary 12. This implies the result for |=M. If CM = {a, e} ∪
{e1, e2, . . . }, with e  ei and a  ei, then ϕ |=M ψ iff ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ and
var(ψ) ⊆ var(ψ), by Theorem 1. By Corollary 11.3, this implies the result
for |=M. Similarly if CM = {a, e} ∪ {a1, a2, . . . }, with e  ai and a  ai,
by Theorem 2 and Corollary 11.3. The same reasoning applies to the case
where CM = {a, e} ∪ {e1, e2, e3, . . . } ∪ {a1, a2, . . . }, independently from the
linear order imposed on {e1, e2, e3, . . . } ∪ {a1, a2, . . . }.
The next corollary immediately follows from Proposition 5, Proposition 6,
and Proposition 7:
Corollary 13 Take any matrix M with contaminating values that is based
onMEfde, such that TM = TMEfde∪CM. The single-premise/single-conclusion
version of |=M will satisfy one of the following cases:40
• ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MS∗
fde
ψ
• ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=MdS∗
fde
ψ
• ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=McrossS∗
fde
ψ
40Notice that we could equivalently replace the last item with ϕ |=M ψ ⇔ ϕ |=McrossdS∗
fde
ψ, by Corollary 12.
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In turn, the results from this section imply that any matrix obeying the
conditions from Proposition 5 will provide an fde-fragment of the logic S∗ by
[17], and any matrix obeying the conditions from Proposition 7 will provide
the Efde-fragment of the first-degree fragment of the logic Eq of equality by
[25].
6 Discussion
The results from the previous sections have revealed (or have confirmed)
interesting connections between relevant logics obeying CH and a number
of other formal traditions, including containment logic, the logics of mean-
inglessness by Bochvar [6] and Hallde´n [35], and the Logic of Equality by
[25]. In this section, we discuss a philosophical issue that is connected with
our results, and two open problems that turn out to be interesting in light
of them. Also, we briefly discuss the connections between our approach and
algebraic constructions known as P lonka sums. We start with Routley’s
criticism of the containment logic project.
6.1 Routley’s Criticism of Containment Logic
The results of this paper come with a broad picture on the relations between
component homogeneity, logic of meaninglessness, relevance, and contain-
ment logic.41 Interestingly for this special issue, this picture sheds new light
on the criticism Routley cast on containment logic in [51]. In a nutshell,
Routley believed that containment logic would fail to admit a natural se-
mantic reading that complement the variable-inclusion requirement, to the
effect that that VIC→ and VIC would turn to be ad hoc moves, devoid of
any significant conceptual insight [51, 53]. This would seriously jeopardize
the containment logic project: lack of a natural semantic insight undermines
the appeal of a logic to any application whatsoever. We believe that Rout-
ley’s criticism does not pack a punch, at least against logics obeying VIC, in
light of the results from Section 3. We recapitulate the criticism and then
we relate the results from Section 3 to it.
Routley’s criticism has its origin in a conjecture by Go¨del reported by
[43]:
41This is also done by [28, 27, 54], but we believe the results presented here make
a progress with respect to those papers, and allow for more general conclusions—see
Section 3.
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[...] perhaps, “p analytically implies q” can be interpreted as “q
is derivable from p and the logical axioms and does not include
any other concepts than p”.
The conjecture concerns PAI, a system that obeys VIC→ and is introduced
by [42]. It was confirmed by [29], by a characterization result that resem-
bles our results from Section 3. Nearly every system obeying VIC→ and
introduced in the literature admits such an analysis. A similar analysis is
admitted by nearly any (known) system obeying VIC,42 if we shift from the
conditional to the consequence (or derivability) relation. Thus, Go¨del’s in-
terpretation applies also to the non-tautological containment systems that
we have investigated in Section 3.
When Routley developed his criticism [51, 53], semantic analysis of con-
tainment logic was quite underdeveloped. This prompted him to see con-
tainment logic as a mere ‘double-barrelled analysis’43 [53] of an implication
(or entailment) relation, that is an analysis that assumes an independently
defined consequence relation, and then imposes (syntactic) ‘sieves or strain-
ers, which capture a tighter connection through controlled cases (“sieving”)
of a slacker one’ [53, p. 166]. In absence of a natural semantic reading,44 the
imposition of the ‘variable-inclusion filter ’ [51, p. 100] by VIC→ would just
be an ad hoc move, devoid of any philosophical insight. Ideally—and given
the above—the same would apply to VIC, if we shift to the consequence
relation.
We believe that Routley’s criticism is countered in light of the results
from this paper (especially, Section 3), and his conclusion no more tenable—
at least when it comes to non-tautological containment systems and VIC.
Indeed, Theorem 1 provides a semantic recipe to generate a containment
logic out of a many-valued logic L (which may well fail to be a containment
system itself). The key ingredient is, in turn, a non-designated and contam-
inating value e, whose formal behavior fits a very natural interpretation as
42In particular, Theorem 1 proves that every containment logic generated from a many-
valued logic by inclusion of e admits the analysis. The system RC by [37] does not fall
under the analysis, but at the cost of deviating form the Tarskian definition of consequence
and endorsing connexivity—a move that has no connection with the variable-inclusion
principle characteristic of containment logic. Also note that the system introduced by
Hallde´n as S0 in [34] has so far resisted this type of analysis.
43Less pejoratively, this is called a ‘Go¨del-Fine analysis’ in [26].
44As [27] notices, Fine’s procedure to track down variable inclusion in [29] is semantic,
but it does not seem to provide an intuitive insight or reading of the notions assumed by
containment logic.
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meaningless—the very interpretation Routley and Goddard suggested for
the value. Also, notice that Theorem 1 is a sort of ‘Go¨del conjecture’ for
Sfde, S
∗
fde, and similar systems, but this is not a problem: the conjecture
only harms containment logic if its semantic machinery does not provide
a natural insight. This is not the case for the logics we present here and,
in principle, for all the containment systems that can be generated by the
recipe of Theorem 1.45 This suffices to dispel the suggestion that contain-
ment logic cannot have any convincing application: one of the containment
logics presented here (namely, S∗fde) even qualifies as relevant logic of mean-
inglessness—a bit ironically, given Routley’s interest in relevance and mean-
inglessness.46
6.2 Open Problems
This paper hints at two open problems that we wish to tackle in future
research: the problem of endowing a logic obeying VIC with a conditional
obeying VIC→, and the problem of finding a many-valued semantics for an
Efde-based counterpart of the first-degree fragment of the Logic of Equality
by [25].
Conditionals obeying VIC→. A number of containment systems non-
trivially obey VIC→ [17, 18, 19, 29, 42]: the information from the con-
sequents of their valid conditionals is included in the information of their
antecedents. Others, like Sfde and S
∗
fde from this paper, obey VIC. Clearly,
a logic that non-trivially obeys VIC→ cannot obey VIC: ∅ |= ϕ→ ψ comes
with var(ϕ→ ψ) 6⊆ var(∅). Stating the converse: any logic obeying VIC
can obey VIC→ just in a trivial way—which is indeed what happens to Sfde
and S∗fde.
If we wish to endorse containment logic and maintain that a (valid)
conditional should somehow internalize a (valid) entailment, then we need
to reconcile a variable-inclusion requirement for valid conditionals with a
variable-inclusion requirement for valid inferences. This in turn implies
that some exceptions to VIC are made, and it leads to a logic where (i)
VIC is violated only by valid conditionals, and (ii) valid conditionals obey
45Unless they do not contain other semantic items that seem to be ad hoc, or arbitrary,
or devoid of a convincing informal interpretation.
46Anderson and Belnap [2, p. 432] also challenge containment logic as a tool to capture
Kant’s notion of analyticity. We refer the reader to [27, pp. 334–336] for this issue, and for
some convincing objections to the criticism. Interestingly, Parry seems to have a notion
of analyticity that differs from Kant’s, and his considerations suggests a natural reading
of non-designated contaminating values that resembles the one by Prior [49].
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VIC→. The single-premise/single-conclusion version of MS∗fde (or MSfde)
can determine such a logic, but only at the cost of a syntactical restric-
tion—dropping the nesting of the conditional—that does not prove partic-
ularly attractive. Thus, we may want to pursue a more general solution
that allows for nesting—in a word, we may want to work with a full-fledged
conditional. This prompts two natural questions: (1) ‘What semantics for
→ can do the job with respect to VIC→ and VIC, and at the same time
provide a clear semantic insight on the notions modeled?’ and (2) ‘Can this
semantics (if any) complement the many-valued apparatus presented here in
a conceptually insightful way?’.
Existing background clarifies the relevance of the first question: there are
many semantic analysis of VIC→-abiding conditionals [17, 18, 19, 29], but
they do not bring a particularly clear semantic insight. To be more precise,
they refine the truth conditions of strict conditionals by the very syntactic
restriction proposed by [42] and expressed by VIC→, to the effect that they
fall victim of Routley’s criticism—remember that our considerations above
only shielded (some) logics obeying VIC from the criticism. If an insightful
and complete semantic analysis is not provided for conditionals obeying
VIC→, then the charge that they are mere ‘filters’ cannot be escaped. As
a consequence, question (1) is crucial to the tenability of conditionals that
satisfy VIC→—such as the ‘analytical implication’ from [19, 29, 42].
As for question (2), it is crucial to understand if the semantic insight
from the logics presented in this paper can be extended to the connective
obeying VIC→. A positive answer to the question would make systems
like Sfde and S
∗
fde the ground for more comprehensive formalisms, where a
match between implication and entailment—supported by many relevant
logicians—is guaranteed.
We believe that the integration of our many-valued semantics with differ-
ent families of intensional semantics for → (intuitionistic, relevant, Nelson-
style) would generate interesting extensions where the conditional would
obey, at least to some extent, VIC→. In particular, we conjecture that the
integration of a contaminating value e with appropriate ternary (relevantist)
semantics for → would secure a conditional that obeys VIC→ without re-
strictions.
Standard Semantics for the Logic of Equality. The logic Eq of equal-
ity is a special case of relatedness logic by [25]. We have seen in Section 5
that [41] provides a many-valued semantics for the fde-fragment of Eq, and
that the single-premise/single-conclusion version of crossS∗fde (or crossdS
∗
fde)
provides the Efde-fragment of the first-degree fragment of Eq. No standard
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(many-valued or Kripke-style) semantics is known for the general case. Since
the proposal by [25] enjoys a relatively idiosyncratic semantics, a positive
answer to this question would help complement the interesting mathemat-
ical perspective of the ‘Logic of Equality’ project with a more standard
semantics.47
A Kripke-style semantics for Eq easily obtains by adapting condition
var(ψ) ⊆ var(ϕ) from Fine’s semantics for analytic conditionals ϕ → ψ—
see [29]—to the condition that var(ϕ) = var(ψ).48 Similarly, we can get an
Efde-based Logic of Equality with a full-fledged conditional → by imposing
var(ϕ) = var(ψ) in the satisfaction of conditionals ϕ → ψ and weaken-
ing the satisfaction relation from [29] in order to get paraconsistency and
paracompleteness.49 However, this option would again fail to bring a clear
semantic (and informal) insight (see discussion from previous paragraph).
One different strategy would consist in finding a matrix M such that, for
every Γ,∆ ⊆ L:
(∗) Γ |=M ∆ ⇔ Γ′ |=MEfde ∆′ for some Γ′ ⊆ Γ,∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that
var(∆′) = var(Γ′)
and then integrating the resulting logic with a conditional obeying var(ϕ) =
var(ψ) (again, see discussion from previous paragraph). Thus, the open
question is: ‘What many-valued semantics (if any) can result in a matrix
M that guarantees the characterization by (∗)?’ Our conjecture is that
this characterization can be granted just by adoption of an infinitely-valued
semantics.
6.3 Contamination and P lonka Sums of Logical Matrices
There is a close connection between Theorem 2 from Section 4 and an alge-
braic construction known as P lonka sums of (direct systems of) logical matri-
ces.50 In particular, once a matrixM is fixed, the extensionM[a] ofM with
a designated contaminating value a can be obtained as the P lonka sum over
47Epstein also offers an algebraic semantics for Eq in [24], which had a narrower circu-
lation than the one by [25]. We wish to devote future work to a comparison between our
semantic approach to Eq and the algebraic approach by [24].
48[29] actually talks about the concepts in ϕ, ψ, and their algebraic relations; things do
not change, however, if we rephrase the condition in terms of variable inclusion.
49The first is secured by allowing ν+(p) ∩ ν−(p) 6= ∅, the second by allowing ν+(p) ∪
ν−(p) 6= W , where W is the set of possible worlds and ν+ and ν− are functions from P
to ℘(W ).
50We owe this remark to an anonymous referee.
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a direct system of logical matrices. Such a direct system includes the origi-
nal matrix M and a particular matrix M+ such that TM+ = DM+ = {a}.
We briefly discuss the relations between the two different approaches here.
P lonka sums of matrices have been explicitly defined in [8], although
they are already applied in [7], and they upgrade the notion of a P lonka
sum over (a direct systems of) algebras by [44], to similar sums of matrices.
In a nutshell, P lonka sums of logical matrices allow us to create a new matrix
out of a given collection of matrices by (1) merging the truth values of these
different matrices, (2) suitably defining the operations of the new structure
in terms of the initial operations of such matrices, and (3) defining a new
set of designated values out of the initial ones. We refer to [7, 8, 44] for
a general definition of the construction and related notions. Here, we just
zoom in on the particular case of a P lonka sum over (a direct system of)
two logical matrices.
When considering a tuple M1, . . . ,Mn of matrices of the form Mi =
〈TMi ,DMi ,OMi〉, for which we write Ai as short for 〈TMi ,OMi〉 for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Given two matrices M1 and M2 whose algebras A1 and A2
have the same type τ , a direct system XM1,M2 of M1 and M2 is a triple
〈Ai,DMi , {ϕi,j : i ≤ j}〉i,j∈{1,2}, where {ϕi,j : i ≤ j} is a set of homomor-
phisms from TMi to TMj satisfying the following ϕi,j(DMi) ⊆ DMj . Then,
the P lonka sum Pl(XM1,M2) over the direct system XM1,M2 is the triple
〈
⋃
1≤i≤2
TMi ,
⋃
1≤i≤2
DMi , {kPl(XM1,M2 ) | k ∈ τ}〉
where, for every n-ary k ∈ τ and a1, . . . , an ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n TMi :
kPl(XM1,M2 ) = kAj (ϕi1,j(a1), . . . , ϕin,j(an))
with n ≥ 1 and ar ∈ TMir and j = i1 ∨ · · · ∨ in. In a sense, the construction
of kPl(XM1,M2 ) ‘merges’ the truth tables characterizing the operation k in
M1 andM2, further determining the behavior of this operation when it has
inputs from the different TM1 and TM2 .
An example will help get a concrete feeling of how the construction
works. SupposeM1 =MCL andM2 =M? = {{a}, {a}, f¬, f∨, f∧}. There
is only one direct system of the two matrices, where ϕ1,2(t) = ϕ1,2(f) = a.
As is clear by the definition of a P lonka sum, {t, a, f} are the truth values of
Pl(XM1,M2), and {t, a} are its designated values. As for the connectives, it
follows by the definition that these behave as per Definition 14. This implies
that MPWK = MCL[a] can be obtained as the P lonka sum of MCL and
M?. Similar constructions apply for the other matrices that we discuss in
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Section 4. In particular,MdS∗fde =MEfde [a] from Definition 13 obtains as the
P lonka sum ofMEfde andM?, whileMdSfde from Definition 15 obtains as the
P lonka sum ofMK3 andM?.51 This kind of construction can be generalized.
In particular, for every matrix M = 〈TM,DM,OM〉 its extension M[a]
with a designated contaminating value is the P lonka sum of (the direct
system formed by) the matrices M and M+ = 〈{a}, {a},OM+〉, where
OM+ denotes the transformation of the set OM obtained from substituting
all the elements of TM for a.
Thus, appropriate P lonka sums match our method for generating logics
satisfying CH with at least one designated value. However, at least the most
straightforward application of the current definition of a P lonka sum over
(direct systems of) logical matrices is of no help in interpreting the extension
of a given matrix with an undesignated contaminating value. In particular,
given a matrix M as above, we would expect the extension M[e] of M
with an undesignated contaminating value e to be obtained as the P lonka
sum over a direct system of logical matrices including M and a particular
matrixM++ = 〈{e}, ∅,OM++〉, where OM++ denotes the transformation of
the set OM obtained from substituting all the elements of TM for e. We can
show that this cannot be the case, by focusing on the instatiation of this
technique to obtain the matrix MSfde = MLP[e]. Suppose M1 = MLP and
M2 =M?? = {{e}, ∅, f¬, f∨, f∧}. There is only one direct system of these
two matrices, where ϕ1,2(t) = ϕ1,2(b) = ϕ1,2(f) = e. However, according to
this ϕ1,2(DMLP) 6⊆ ∅, which violates the inclusion conditions from [7]. A
similar line of reasoning applies to the case of MS∗fde .
We believe that this can be easily fixed. In particular, our conjecture is
that matrices of the form M[e] can be obtained by a similar P lonka-style
construction, where the condition from [8] is relaxed. We hope to establish
a more articulated bridge between the approach by [7, 8] and ours in future
work. In particular, we wish to check our conjecture, discussing P lonka sums
interpeting crossS∗fde and crossdS
∗
fde, and checking whether Epstein’s Logic
of Equality Eq can be interpreted in terms of P lonka constructions.
7 Sequent Calculi
In this section, we give sound and complete sequent calculi for S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, and
the first-degree fragment of crossS∗fde and crossdS
∗
fde. A sequent calculus is a
particular kind of proof system that has been introduced by Gentzen [30, 31].
It has since then proved to be very useful and flexible to provide calculi for
51We have to thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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a variety of logical systems, of both classical and non-classical sorts. Here,
we show how the approach can provide appropriate proof systems for logics
with contaminating values. The following results have a close connection
to the calculi presented in [13] for the {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of Bochvar’s and
Hallde´n’s logics of nonsense B3 and H3, respectively, i.e. the logics that in
this paper we call Kw3 and PWK, in line with the recent literature.
We shift notation a bit with respect to previous chapters, and we use ⇒
to denote the derivability relation, rather than as a metatheoretical condi-
tional as in the rest of the paper. This small change will help fit the most
widespread proof-theoretical notation on sequents.
7.1 Preliminaries
Definition 17 By a sequent S over L we mean an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 of
(non-simultaneously empty) finite sets of formulas in L, written Γ⇒ ∆ for
ease of notation.
The sequent calculi to be discussed next are obtained from various com-
binations of the following rules:
ϕ⇒ ϕ (Id)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ (W ⇒)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ (⇒W )
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ∆ (Cut)
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ (¬ ⇒)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,∆ (⇒ ¬)
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆ (∧ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆ (⇒ ∧)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆ (∨ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ (⇒ ∨)
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Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬¬ϕ⇒ ∆ (¬¬ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬¬ϕ,∆ (⇒ ¬¬)
Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ∆ (¬∧ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆ (⇒ ¬∧)
Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ ∆ (¬∨ ⇒)
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ¬ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ),∆ (⇒ ¬∨)
provided
var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(∆)
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆ (∧
H ⇒)
provided
var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(Γ)
Γ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ (⇒ ∨
B)
provided
var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(∆)
Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ ∆ (¬∨
H ⇒)
provided
var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(Γ)
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆ (⇒ ¬∧
B)
Definition 18 ([30, 31]) The sequent calculus LK over L is defined by the
rules (Id), (W ⇒), (⇒ W ), (Cut), (¬ ⇒), (⇒ ¬), (∧ ⇒), (⇒ ∧), (∨ ⇒), (⇒
∨).
Definition 19 The sequent calculus LK ′ over L is defined by adding to the
calculus LK the rules (¬¬ ⇒), (⇒ ¬¬), (¬∧ ⇒), (⇒ ¬∧), (¬∨ ⇒), (⇒ ¬∨).
Definition 20 The sequent calculus LK ′′ over L is defined by subtracting
from the calculus LK ′ the rules (¬ ⇒) and (⇒ ¬).
Definition 21 The sequent calculus GS∗fde over L is defined by subtracting
from the calculus LK ′′ the rules (⇒ ∨) and (⇒ ¬∧) and later adding the
rules (⇒ ∨B) and (⇒ ¬∧B).
Definition 22 The sequent calculus GdS∗fde over L is defined by subtracting
from the calculus LK ′′ the rules (∧ ⇒) and (¬∨ ⇒) and later adding the
rules (∧H ⇒) and (¬∨H ⇒).
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Definition 23 The sequent calculus GcrossS∗fde (alternatively GcrossdS∗fde)
over L is defined by subtracting from the calculus LK ′′ the rules (⇒ ∨),
(∧ ⇒), (⇒ ¬∧) and (¬∨ ⇒) and later adding the rules (⇒ ∨B), (∧H ⇒),
(⇒ ¬∧B) and (¬∨H ⇒).
Proposition 8 ([30, 31]) LK is sound and complete with respect to CL
Theorem 3 ([4]) LK ′′ is sound and complete with respect to Efde
Theorem 4 ([4]) Let Γ ∪ ∆ be finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If
the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable in LK ′′, then there is a Cut-free derivation
of it.
7.2 Soundness and completeness of GS∗fde
In what follows we proceed to prove the soundness and completeness results
for the sequent calculus GS∗fde. For soundness, the proof is standard, by the
usual means.
Definition 24 Let L be a matrix logic. A valuation ν of L is a model of a
sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, symbolized ν |=ML Γ ⇒ ∆, if and only if ν(Γ) ⊆ DL, then
ν(δ) ∈ DL for some δ ∈ ∆
Definition 25 A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is valid in L, symbolized |=ML Γ ⇒ ∆, if
for every valuation ν for L, ν |= Γ⇒ ∆
Definition 26 A sequent rule R preserves validity in L if for every instance
r
S
of R and for every valuation ν of L, if ν |=ML S′ for every S′ ∈ r, then
ν |=ML S
Lemma 1 Every sequent rule of the calculus GS∗fde preserves S∗fde-validity
Obviously the axioms and structural rules preserve validity. We prove the
case for the restricted operational rules and leave the remaining cases as an
exercise to the reader:
(⇒ ∨B) Let ν be a S∗fde valuation such that ν |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆ and as-
sume that var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(Γ). Suppose ν(Γ) ⊆ {t, b}. Thus, ν(p) ∈
{t, b, n, f}, for every propositional variable p ∈ var(Γ) and, therefore,
ν(p) ∈ {t, b, n, f}, for every propositional variable p ∈ var({ϕ,ψ}).
Moreover, ν(ϕ) ∈ {t, b, n, f} and ν(ψ) ∈ {t, b, n, f}. By hypothe-
sis, {t, b} ∩ ν(∆ ∪ {ϕ,ψ}) 6= ∅. Thus, either {t, b} ∩ ν(∆) 6= ∅, or
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{t, b} ∩ ν(ϕ) 6= ∅, or {t, b} ∩ ν(ψ) 6= ∅. Finally, given the fact that
ν(ϕ) ∈ {t, b, n, f} and ν(ψ) ∈ {t, b, n, f}, and given the S∗fde valuations
for disjunction, we can establish that in all these cases it follows that
{t, b} ∩ ν(∆ ∪ {ϕ ∨ ψ}) 6= ∅. Therefore, ν |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆.
(⇒ ¬∧B) Let ν be a S∗fde valuation such that ν |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆ and
assume that var({ϕ,ψ}) ⊆ var(Γ). Suppose ν(Γ) ⊆ {t, b}, whence
ν(p) ∈ {t, b, n, f}, for every propositional variable p ∈ var(Γ). Thus,
ν(p) ∈ {t, b, n, f}, for every propositional variable p ∈ var({ϕ,ψ}) and,
moreover, ν(¬ϕ) ∈ {t, b, n, f} and ν(¬ψ) ∈ {t, b, n, f}. By hypothesis,
{t, b} ∩ ν(∆ ∪ {¬ϕ,¬ψ}) 6= ∅. Thus, either {t, b} ∩ ν(∆) 6= ∅, or
{t, b} ∩ ν(¬ϕ) 6= ∅, or {t, b} ∩ ν(¬ψ) 6= ∅. Finally, given the fact
that ν(¬ϕ) ∈ {t, b, n, f} and ν(¬ψ) ∈ {t, b, n, f}, and given the S∗fde
valuations for negation and conjunction, we can establish that in all
these cases it follows that {t, b} ∩ ν(∆ ∪ {¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)}) 6= ∅. Therefore,
ν |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆.
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5 (Soundness of GS∗fde) Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of
formulas of L. If Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde, then |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆.
If Γ ⇒ ∆ is an axiom, then it is valid in GS∗fde. By induction on the
depth of a derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆ in GS∗fde it follows, by the above Lemma 3,
that Γ⇒ ∆ is valid in GS∗fde.
Proposition 9 (Non-triviality of GS∗fde) Let Γ be a finite non-empty set
of formulas of L. The sequent Γ⇒ ∅ is not provable in GS∗fde
Let ν be a S∗fde-valuation such that ν(p) = b for every p ∈ var(Γ). It
follows that ν 6|=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∅ and thus 6|=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∅. By contraposition of
Soundness, we can conclude that the sequent Γ⇒ ∅ is not provable in GS∗fde
We now turn to completeness. Completeness of GS∗fde with respect to S∗fde
follows easily by adapting and putting together the techniques introduced
in [13] for proving the completeness of the appropriate calculi for Kw3 and
PWK. The same for the completeness of GdS∗fde with respect to dS∗fde.
Proposition 10 Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L, then:
if |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆, then |=MEfde Γ⇒ ∆
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Straightforward, since the set of MEfde-valuations is a subset of the set
of MS∗fde-valuations.
Proposition 11 Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If
Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde, then it is provable in LK ′′
Straightforward, since GS∗fde is a restriction of LK ′′.
Lemma 2 Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If Γ⇒ ∆
is provable in LK ′′ and var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ), then Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde
without using the Cut rule.
Remember that proofs in sequent calculi are rooted binary trees such that
the root is the sequent being proved and the leafs of the tree are instances of
the axiom, in other words, sequents of the form ϕ⇒ ϕ. Now, assume that Π
is a Cut-free derivation of Γ⇒ ∆ in LK ′′ such that the root of the sequent
Γ ⇒ ∆ such that indeed var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ). If Π is a Cut-free derivation
in GS∗fde, then the result is established. If Π is not a Cut-free derivation in
GS∗fde, then there must be in Π applications of the rules (⇒ ∨) and (⇒ ¬∧)
where the required provisos are not satisfied
Γ∗ ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆∗
Γ∗ ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆∗ (⇒ ∨)
Γ∗∗ ⇒ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆∗∗
Γ∗∗ ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆∗∗ (⇒ ¬∧)
Since Π is a Cut-free proof, we are guaranteed that the root sequent Γ⇒ ∆
contains all the propositional variables appearing in Π. Since, by hypothesis,
we know that var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ), we can affirm that var(Π) = var(Γ). What
is left is, then, to design an algorithmic procedure to transform Π into a
Cut-free proof of Γ⇒ ∆ in GS∗fde. We do this in two steps. First, we enlarge
every node of Π by adding Γ to its left-hand side. By doing this, we obtain
a rooted binary tree Π′, whose leafs are sequents of the form Γ, ϕ ⇒ ϕ.
Second, we extend each leaf with a branch starting in an instance of the
axioms, that is, a sequent of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ, followed by any number of
necessary iterated applications of the left Weakening rule (W ⇒), so that
the sequent Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ is obtained.
From this procedure, we get a rooted binary tree Π′′ which is undoubt-
edly a Cut-free derivation in LK ′′ of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, such that the
critical instances of the rules (∨ ⇒) and (⇒ ¬∧) have in Π′′ the form
Γ,Γ∗ ⇒ ϕ,ψ,∆∗
Γ,Γ∗ ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆∗ (⇒ ∨)
Γ,Γ∗∗ ⇒ ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆∗∗
Γ,Γ∗∗ ⇒ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆∗∗ (⇒ ¬∧)
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and are, thus, admissible in GS∗fde. Finally, from this we infer that Π′′ is a
Cut-free derivation in GS∗fde of the sequent Γ⇒ ∆.
Corollary 14 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If
|=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆ but var(∆) 6⊆ var(Γ), then there is a ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that
|=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆′, where var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ).
First, notice that if |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆, then var(Γ) 6= ∅ 6= var(∆). Now,
assume |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆ but var(∆) * var(Γ). Hence, define ∆′ = ∆ \ {δ ∈
∆ | var(δ) * var(Γ)}, whence ∆′ ⊂ ∆ and var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ). Suppose
additionally, for reductio, that there is anMS∗fde-valuation ν such that ν(Γ) ⊆{t, b}, but ν(∆′) ⊆ {n, tv, f}, thus implying 6|=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆′. Construct an
MS∗fde valuation ν ′ such that ν ′(p) = ν(p) for all p ∈ var(Γ) and ν ′(p′) = e
for all p′ ∈ var(∆) \ var(Γ). Hence, ν ′ is such that ν ′(Γ) ⊆ {t, b}, but
ν ′(∆) ⊆ {n, e, f}, which implies that 6|=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆, contradicting our initial
assumption. Thus, there is a ∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆′, where
var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ).
Theorem 6 (Completeness of GS∗fde) Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set
of formulas of L. If |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆, then Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde without
using the Cut rule.
Assume |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆. By Proposition 10, we know that |=MEfde Γ ⇒
∆, and also by Theorem 3 we are granted that Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in LK ′′.
To finally establish that Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde without using the Cut
rule, we consider two cases. First, if var(∆) ⊆ var(Γ), we know by Lemma 2
that this is the case. Second, if var(∆) 6⊆ var(Γ), we know by Corollary 14
that there is a ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that |=MS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆′, where var(∆′) ⊆ var(Γ).
Now, by Lemma 2 we know that Γ⇒ ∆′ is provable in GS∗fde without using
the Cut rule, by means of a proof Π1 (i.e. a binary rooted tree) whose
root is Γ ⇒ ∆′ and whose leafs are instances of the axioms, of the form
ϕ ⇒ ϕ. Finally, we transform Π1 into a proof Π′1, by extending down the
node Γ ⇒ ∆′ by means of the required iterated applications of the right
Weakening rule (⇒ W ), until we arrive at the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆. But this
rooted binary tree Π′1 is now a a proof in GS∗fde of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆,
without using the Cut rule.
Corollary 15 (Cut-elimination for S∗fde) Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty
set of formulas in L. If the sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is provable, then there is a Cut-
free derivation of Γ⇒ ∆ in S∗fde.
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Assume that Γ ⇒ ∆′ is provable in GS∗fde without using the Cut rule.
By Theorem 5, that is, because the system is sound, we know that |=MS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆. But, then, by Theorem 6, that is, becuase the system is complete,
we know that Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GS∗fde without using the Cut rule.
7.3 Soundness and Completeness of GdS∗fde
Most of the proofs in this Section are straightforward adaptations of the
proofs recently discussed. Thus, we omit them for the sake of readability,
and we provide details just when they can yield special insights.
Lemma 3 Every sequent rule of the calculus GdS∗fde preserves dS∗fde-validity
Theorem 7 (Soundness of GdS∗fde) Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set
of formulas of L. If Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde, then |=MdS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆.
Proposition 12 (Non-triviality of GdS∗fde) Let Γ be a finite non-empty
set of formulas of L. The sequent Γ⇒ ∅ is not provable in GdS∗fde
Proposition 13 Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L, then:
if |=MdS∗
fde
Γ⇒ ∆, then |=MEfde Γ⇒ ∆
Proposition 14 Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If
Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde, then it is provable in LK ′′
Lemma 4 Let Γ ∪∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If Γ⇒ ∆
is provable in LK ′′ and var(Γ) ⊆ var(∆), then Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde
without using the Cut rule.
Again, remember that proofs in sequent calculi are rooted binary trees
such that the root is the sequent being proved and the leafs of the tree are
instances of the axiom, in other words, sequents of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ. Now,
assume that Π is a Cut-free derivation of Γ⇒ ∆ in LK ′′ such that the root
of the sequent Γ⇒ ∆ such that indeed var(Γ) ⊆ var(∆). If Π is a Cut-free
derivation in GdS∗fde, then the result is established. If Π is not a Cut-free
derivation in GdS∗fde, then there must be in Π applications of the rules (∧ ⇒)
and (¬∨ ⇒) where the required provisos are not satisfied
Γ∗, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆∗
Γ∗, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆∗ (∧ ⇒)
Γ∗∗,¬ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆∗∗
Γ∗∗,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ ∆∗∗ (¬∨ ⇒)
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Now, since Π is a Cut-free proof, we are guaranteed that the root sequent
Γ ⇒ ∆ contains all the propositional variables appearing in Π. Since, by
hypothesis, we know that var(Γ) ⊆ var(∆), we can affirm that var(Π) =
var(∆). What is left is, then, to design a procedure to transform Π into
a Cut-free proof of Γ ⇒ ∆ in GdS∗fde. We do this in two steps. First,
we enlarge every node of Π by adding ∆ to its right-hand side. By doing
this, we obtain a rooted binary tree Π′, whose leafs are sequents of the
form ϕ ⇒ ϕ,∆. Second, we extend each leaf with a branch starting in an
instance of the axioms, that is, a sequent of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ, followed by
any number of necessary iterated applications of the right Weakening rule
(⇒ W ), so that the sequent ϕ ⇒ ϕ,∆ is obtained. From this procedure,
we get a rooted binary tree Π′′ which is undoubtedly a Cut-free derivation
in LK ′′ of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, such that the critical instances of the rules
(∨ ⇒) and (⇒ ¬∧) have in Π′′ the form
Γ∗, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆∗,∆
Γ∗, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆∗,∆ (∧ ⇒)
Γ∗∗,¬ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆∗∗,∆
Γ∗∗,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ ∆∗∗,∆ (¬∨ ⇒)
and are, thus, admissible in GdS∗fde. Finally, from this we infer that Π′′ is a
Cut-free derivation in GdS∗fde of the sequent Γ⇒ ∆.
Corollary 16 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty set of formulas of L. If
|=MdS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆ but var(Γ) 6⊆ var(∆), then there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that
|=MdS∗
fde
Γ′ ⇒ ∆, where var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆).
Theorem 8 (Completeness of GdS∗fde) Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a finite non-empty
set of formulas of L. If |=MdS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆, then Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde
without using the Cut rule.
Assume |=MdS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆. By Proposition 13, we know that |=MEfde Γ ⇒
∆, and also by Theorem 3 we are granted that Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in LK ′′.
To finally establish that Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde without using the Cut
rule, we consider two cases. First, if var(Γ) ⊆ var(∆), we know by Lemma 4
that this is the case. Second, if var(Γ) 6⊆ var(∆), we know by Corollary 16
that there is a Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that |=MdS∗
fde
Γ ⇒ ∆′, where var(Γ′) ⊆ var(∆).
Now, by Lemma 4 we know that Γ′ ⇒ ∆ is provable in GdS∗fde without using
the Cut rule, by means of a proof Π1 (i.e. a binary rooted tree) whose root
is Γ′ ⇒ ∆ and whose leafs are instances of the axioms, of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ.
Finally, we transform Π1 into a proof Π
′
1, by extending down the node
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Γ′ ⇒ ∆ by means of the required iterated applications of the left Weakening
rule (W ⇒), until we arrive at the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆. But this rooted binary
tree Π′1 is now a a proof in GdS∗fde of the sequent Γ⇒ ∆, without using the
Cut rule.
Corollary 17 (Cut-elimination for dS∗fde) Let Γ∪∆ be a finite non-empty
set of formulas in L. If the sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is provable, then there is a Cut-
free derivation of Γ⇒ ∆ in dS∗fde.
7.4 Soundness and Completeness of the First-Degree Frag-
ment of GcrossS∗fde and GcrossdS∗fde
Here, we prove soundness and completeness of a particular case of GcrossS∗fde,
namely the case where Γ = {ϕ} and ∆ = {ψ} in Γ ⇒ ∆. By the results
from Section 5, all the conclusions concerning the first-degree fragment of
crossS∗fde immediately apply to the first-degree fragment of crossdS
∗
fde.
Proposition 15 Let ϕ and ψ be formulas in L. ϕ ⇒ ψ is provable in
GcrossS∗fde without using the Cut rule if and only if ϕ ⇒ ψ is provable in
GS∗fde without using the Cut rule and in GdS∗fde without using the Cut rule.
Straightforward, by Definition 23.
Theorem 9 (soundness of GcrossS∗fde) Let ϕ and ψ be formulas in L. If
ϕ⇒ ψ is provable in GcrossS∗fde, then |=McrossS∗
fde
ϕ⇒ ψ.
Suppose ϕ ⇒ ψ is provable in GcrossS∗fde. By Proposition 15, ϕ ⇒ ψ is
provable in GS∗fde and in GdS∗fde. By the former and Theorem 5, we know
that |=MS∗
fde
ϕ ⇒ ψ, whereas by the latter and Theorem 7 we know that
|=MdS∗
fde
ϕ⇒ ψ. Finally, by these and Corollary 12, we know that |=McrossS∗
fde
ϕ⇒ ψ.
Theorem 10 (completeness of GcrossS∗fde) Let ϕ and ψ be formulas in
L. If |=McrossS∗
fde
ϕ⇒ ψ, then ϕ⇒ ψ is provable in GcrossS∗fde without using
the Cut rule.
Suppose |=crossS∗fde ϕ⇒ ψ. By Corollary 12, we know that |=MS∗fde ϕ⇒ ψ
and |=MdS∗
fde
ϕ ⇒ ψ. By the former and Theorem 6, we know that ϕ ⇒ ψ
is provable in GS∗fde withouth using the Cut rule, whereas by the latter and
Theorem 8 we know that ϕ ⇒ ψ is provable in GdS∗fde withouth using the
Cut rule. Finally, by these and Proposition 15 we know that ϕ ⇒ ψ is
provable in GcrossS∗fde.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have established characterization results and complete
sequent calculi for the systems S∗fde, dS
∗
fde and crossS
∗
fde, and we have provided
more general characterization results for two different families of logics that
include S∗fde, dS
∗
fde and crossS
∗
fde. These are many-valued logics that include
at least a contaminating value—that is, a truth value v which turns to be
the output of a function f◦k any time it is also among the inputs of f◦k.
In particular, S∗fde includes a non-designated contaminating value e, dS
∗
fde
includes a designated contaminating value a, and crossS∗fde includes both
contaminating values, with e contaminating a.
Logics S∗fde, dS
∗
fde, and crossS
∗
fde cross the research agenda by Richard
Routley in many different ways. First, they are relevant logic—in particu-
lar, they enjoy the Variable-Sharing Principle for the consequence relation
(VSP from the Introduction), since they are all subsystems of Efde. Second,
they obey a general version of the so-called Contamination Principle. This
is in turn the formal counterpart of the principle of Component Homogeneity
that Goddard and Routley [33] introduce in their project of a logic of sig-
nificance. The principle states that that any sentence having a meaningless
component is itself meaningless. Third, the logic S∗fde provides a relevant
logic of meaninglessness where meaninglessness is treated according to the
main tenets from [33]—that is, as a contaminating and non-designated value.
The results from this paper make a significative progress with respect
to existing literature. First, the general semantic setting that we present in
Section 3 generalizes the semantics from Bochvar[6], Hallde´n [35], Deutsch
[18] and Daniels [15] in allowing different (in principle, infinite) contami-
nating values to interact in the same matrix. The connected contamination
relation proposed by Definition 8 is a natural way to define such an interac-
tion. Second, Theorem 1 (Section 3) provides a general semantic recipe for
generating logics that obey the General Variable-Inclusion Principle GVIC
(from the Introduction) or its weaker version GWVIC. Cognate results from
[11], [27], [41] and [56] turn to be immediate corollaries of the theorem. In
turn, the theorem provides a recipe to define systems of containment log-
ics obeying the Variable-Inclusion Principle VIC (from the Introduction).
Third, Theorem 2 (Section 4) provides a recipe to generate a dual family of
reverse-containment logics, where GVIC is reversed into condition RGVIC
from Section 4. Logics in this family are all subsystems of the logic PWK
from Hallde´n [35]. The characterization results of PWK by [12, 11] and of
their four-, five- and six-valued subsystems introduced in [54] and discussed
here turn out to be corollaries of Theorem 2. Finally, Theorems 6, 8 and 10
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concern the sequent calculi we provided for S∗fde, dS
∗
fde and the first-degree
fragment of both crossS∗fde and crossdS
∗
fde, obtained by applying and general-
izing the techniques implented in [13] to obtain sound and complete sequent
calculi for Kw3 and PWK. The newly introduced sequent calculi for the log-
ics characterized in this paper are proved to be sound and complete, thus
endowing the previous frameworks with suitable proof systems, as is always
desirable.
The paper also highlights interesting connections with other traditions
in non-classical logic. Theorem 1 strengthens the connections between con-
tainment logic, relevant logic and logic of meaninglessness pointed out by
[27, 28]. In particular, the theorem concerns the extension of a matrix with
a non-designated contaminating value e; in turn, such a value can be used
to represent meaninglessness—in line with a formal tradition that includes
Bochvar [6] and Goddard and Routley [33]. All the paraconsistent logics
generated by this recipe obey VSP and VIC. Thus, Theorem 1 shows that
(a family of systems in) containment logic can be used to provide systems
of a relevant logic of meaninglessness—a project that bridges two research
interests by Routley. Also, it is reasonable to say that Routley’s criticism to
the containment logic project looks outdated in light of the result (Section 6).
Corollary 11 and Proposition 4 (Section 5) together cast an interesting con-
necting between the single-premise/single-conclusion version of crossS∗fde and
the first-degree fragment of the Logic of Equality Eq by [25].
Finally, the paper also discusses some open problems, such as the ex-
tension of a logic obeying VIC with a conditional obeying VIC→, and the
pursue of a many-valued semantics for an Efde-based version of the first-
degree fragment of Epstein’s Logic of Equality. We plan to approach these
two problems in future papers.
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